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Cloud computing is an emerging and rapidly growing computing paradigm. According 
to Columbus (2016, 2–3), the worldwide cloud computing market was $110 billion in 
2015, with growth rates of 51% in public IaaS and PaaS offerings and 45% in private 
and hybrid offerings in the same service categories. Big companies are leading the way; 
Amazon Web Services (AWS) generated $7,88 billion in revenue – in the Q4 of 2015 
alone (Columbus 2016, 5). These numbers, in a class of their own, make it very clear 
that cloud computing is a serious transformation in the area of computing services. 
The reason for these staggering growth figures, future projections and the popularity 
of cloud computing lies in the way it has made large scale computing easily available. 
The barriers to entry are significantly lower; even non-existent, and even the smallest 
players can acquire computing resources previously unavailable to them. There is no 
longer a need to make significant capital investments in an infrastructure upfront and to 
hire staff to operate the infrastructure, freeing the resources to focus on the core busi-
ness. This levels the playing field, enabling the small companies to participate in com-
petition with bigger corporations. 
According to Fox, Griffith, Joseph, Katz, Konwinski, Lee, Patterson, Rabkin, Stoica 
& Zaharia (2009, 7–8), reasons for the fast growth of cloud computing are the rapid rise 
of mobile applications, introduction of many data-intensive services and the wide adop-
tion of business analytics. Fox et al. (2009, 1) have defined three characteristics exclu-
sive to cloud computing: the cloud users have practically infinite resources at their dis-
posal, there are no strong financial commitments required from the cloud users, and 
they only pay for the services they actually use. These properties give the cloud the 
unique financial and functional flexibility that cannot be reached by relying solely on 
the traditional data center architecture, where the infrastructure is fully owned by the 
company using it. Different cloud service models combined with different cloud de-
ployment models serve different purposes. These models make cloud computing a rele-
vant alternative to all kinds of business requirements, contributing to its wide adoption 
in business use. 
Despite cloud computing being around for more than a decade, it was only in May 
2013, when the United States Federal Government approved the use of cloud computing 
in federal agencies. The approval was given to the use of Amazon Web Services in fed-
eral service provision. Before this approval Amazon had to go through a thorough risk 
assessment, called FedRAMP. The approval is valid for three years at a time and applies 
only to data centers that are physically located in the US (Barr 2013, 1). 
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This careful risk consideration reflects well the uncertainties related to cloud compu-
ting. As in any agreement between parties, be it a manufacturing subcontract or an 
agreement of consultancy services provided to improve a company’s business process-
es, there are risks involved. Due to the complexity of the cloud computing paradigm, 
also the risks are complex and their management requires broad understanding of the 
technological and operational aspects of the cloud. 
Private companies are generally fast to adapt to new environments, explore new op-
portunities and create new business models based on new technologies, but the same 
uncertainties that the authorities and the general public are concerned about, apply also 
to them. The fact that cloud computing is still under such careful consideration and 
scrutiny by government authorities is a clear indicator of the many uncertainties associ-
ated with it. The widespread news and the ensued debate about the U.S. National Secu-
rity Agency tapping into the personal data of millions of cloud service customers is hard 
evidence that there is a need for careful risk consideration. 
The ISO 31000 standard defines risk as the effect of uncertainty on objectives, the ef-
fect being the deviation from the expected, either positive or negative (Purdy 2010, 
882). There are risks that are more probable and predictable than others, as there are 
risks that are highly unlikely and very hard to predict. Risks also vary greatly in their 
seriousness, from the smallest financial risks to situations that threaten the reputation, 
even the whole business of a company. There could be a break-in to the company office 
building, or a fire in the data center – these two events could have very different out-
comes. Some risks can be measured in financial terms. For example, if a company loses 
one customer due to the realization of a certain risk, it’s possible to estimate the costs 
based on the contract between the company and the customer and by estimating the fu-
ture business prospects that were lost due to the realization of the risk. But when the 
reputation of the company is tarnished due to some unlucky event, it’s much harder to 
figure out the costs, as there are no clear, unambiguous indicators for how many poten-
tial customers were lost due to the event. 
Raz & Hillson (2005, 53–54) note that it’s important to differentiate between busi-
ness risks and operational risks. The business risks are related to financing and insur-
ance, whereas the operational risks are directly related to the business activities of a 
company, and thus more relevant for cloud computing and this study. 
Today, nearly all the information companies handle in order to conduct their business 
activities is stored and processed electronically using different information systems. In 
other words, the confidentiality, availability and integrity of the valuable and business 
critical information is depending on the IT infrastructure of the company. As the tech-
nology evolves and becomes more complex, so do the risks, making it an increasingly 
difficult task to mitigate them. Despite that, a well functioning business should 
acknowledge these risks in all its operations, and as a result, should have a certain 
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amount of built-in resilience against the risks inherent in the way the business and the 
core processes are structured. To achieve this resilience, the companies must have a 
plan for how to deal with the risks. This plan is called a risk management plan, or a risk 
management framework. The ultimate aim of the planning process is to protect the 
company’s ability to maintain its operations  (Stoneburner, Goguen & Feringa 2002, 1). 
When companies choose to use the services of cloud computing providers, they sim-
ultaneously make the decision to hand over their data to the cloud service provider. This 
decision introduces a multitude of risks ranging from the physical access to the data, 
vulnerabilities caused by the complexity of the cloud environment to concerns regarding 
the security of the data (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 2-3). A company could also host a 
private cloud inside its premises using the same technology the big cloud service pro-
viders use; however, from the technical viewpoint it would essentially be the same as 
running a traditional server in-house. 
The focus of this study is on the multi-tier cloud computing that consists of one or 
more parties using the cloud and one or more parties providing the service. These rela-
tionships and the amount of parties involved vary depending on the service model and 
deployment model. More importantly, the focus in the study is limited to those risks that 
the cloud customer faces, not the risks to the service provider. 
1.2 Research questions 
To get an overview of the concept of cloud computing, the background and motivations 
behind cloud computing are presented. Thereafter a thorough literature review called a 
systematic literature review is conducted in order to cover as many of the risks related 
to cloud computing as possible. The data gathered through the literatures review is then 
used to further analyze these risks; the aim is to find out which kinds of risks are specif-
ically relevant to cloud computing in general; for each service model and what kind of 
precautions companies could take in order to effectively mitigate or minimize these 
risks. The following research questions are answered: 
• RQ1: What risks does cloud computing present to companies? 
• RQ2: How do these risks manifest themselves in IaaS, PaaS and SaaS? 
• RQ3: How can companies manage these risks? 
1.3 Structure of the research 
The study consists of 7 chapters. The second chapter introduces the research method, 
systematic literature review and clarifies and justifies the methodological and practical 
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decisions made during the review process. The third chapter focuses on the cloud com-
puting paradigm, beginning with the technological background and historical motiva-
tions for cloud computing, leading up to the present day, Thereafter the structure of 
cloud computing is discussed and the service and deployment models are presented. 
Specific emphasis is placed on the similarities and differences of these models, as they 
are elemental in assessing the risks in cloud computing. In the fourth chapter, the risks 
uncovered in the literature review will be presented. The fifth chapter elaborates on the-
se risks, by discussing the relevance of the risks and their relevance to different cloud 
service models. The sixth chapter is focused on providing different methods or process-
es for assessing, managing and mitigating the risks in cloud computing. Finally, the 
seventh chapter summarizes the findings of this study, and states the limitations of the 
study. 
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2 RESEARCH METHODS 
2.1 Background for the literature review 
The literature review is the basis for any research article. In this paper, the existing liter-
ature of cloud computing and the related risks is reviewed. To achieve a wide enough 
scope and to take all relevant viewpoints into account, a thorough analysis of related 
literature is an essential requirement. According to Webster & Watson (2002, xv–xvi), a 
proper literature review should inform the reader of what is the topic of the review, it 
should aim to cover all viewpoints to the topic and it should be based on multiple quali-
fied sources of information. 
Okoli and Schabram (2010, 2) divide literature reviews into three categories: theoret-
ical background reviews, thesis literature reviews and stand-alone literature reviews. 
The first two types of reviews are concise, in a narrative form and need further empiri-
cal data to provide the answers to the research questions. The third type of literature 
review, the stand-alone review, supports itself without any empirical data; it should be 
methodologically systematic; it should explicitly state the procedures used in conduct-
ing the review, it should aim to include all the relevant material and finally, due to its 
systematic nature, it should be reproducible (Okoli & Schabram 2010, 1). 
Okoli & Schabram (2010, 15) studied the motivations for conducting a systematic 
review by analyzing various systematic literature reviews and divided their findings in 
the following motivations: 
• To analyze a specific field of study in terms of progress 
• To recommend directions for future studies 
• To review the applying of a theoretical model in IS literature 
• To review the applying of a specific methodology in IS literature 
• To produce a model or a framework 
• To answer a specific research question. 
As cloud computing is still a developing phenomenon, the stand-alone literature re-
view is an apt way of getting a good look into it. According to Torraco (2005, 357–
358), the method has it strength in describing new, rising and developing phenomena, as 
usually such fields do not yet have an extensive body of knowledge to build upon. Since 
this study is purely theoretical and doesn’t include any empirical data, the emphasis is 
on the literature review. To ensure sufficient coverage of earlier research, the stand-
alone literature review, or later systematic literature review method is applied. 
A systematic literature review enables the researcher to find gaps in accumulated re-
search knowledge and identify areas where future research is needed (Webster & Wat-
son 2002, xix). Ideally, the review should contribute to the body of knowledge by giv-
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ing informed suggestions for future research and so encourage researchers to build on 
accumulated knowledge in developing new theories (Levy, Ellis 2006, 182).  
Levy & Ellis (2006, 182) view the systematic review as a process of collecting, 
knowing, comprehending, applying, analyzing, synthesizing and evaluating earlier re-
search in order to establish a solid theoretical background for the whole review. Tran-
field, Denyer & Smart (2003, 214) divide the systematic review into three different 
phases: planning, conducting and reporting. Levy & Ellis (2006, 182) use a similar divi-
sion, they name the phases inputs, processing and outputs, respectively. 
2.2 Searching for the literature 
The review begins by precisely defining the terms of the review, i.e. the purpose, scope 
and possible limitations of the review; in order to get high quality output, also the input 
needs to be of high quality (Webster & Watson 2002, xv). However, it’s also important 
that some room for creativity is left; the review will most likely evolve in some way 
during the review process (Tranfield, Denyer & Smart 2003, 215). The decisions re-
garding the terms of the review should be properly documented to ensure the reproduci-
bility of the review (Okoli, Schabram 2010, 16–17). 
The purpose of this literature review is to get an overview of risks in cloud compu-
ting. In the literature search the term risk is considered synonymous with terms and 
concepts like security issue, vulnerability or threat in order to maximize the yield of the 
literature search; these terms often appear mixed in various literature (Subashini, Ka-
vitha 2011; Grobauer, Walloschek & Stöcker 2011; Marston, Li, Bandyopadhyay, 
Zhang & Ghalsasi 2011). All cloud service models and deployment models are in the 
scope of this review. They are presented in detail in chapter 3. 
The next step in the review is the rigorous identification of the search terms that are 
relevant to the research subject. Levy and Ellis (2006, 190) suggest an initial keyword 
search to get an overview of what’s been written about the subject. Webster & Watson 
(2002, xvi) suggest doing a backward search, then a forward search. In the backward 
search, the references of the studies that were found earlier are combed through, and a 
new search is conducted based on these references. Levy & Ellis (2006, 190–191) fur-
ther differentiate between a backward references search and a backwards authors search. 
In the forward search, citations databases are used to find articles that cite the articles 
uncovered in the original search and the backward search, which will likely increase the 
richness of the search results. (Webster, Watson 2002, xvi). 
The search terms have to be chosen so that they guarantee the comprehensiveness of 
the search results. This is especially important in the IS field, as the terminology devel-
ops rapidly and the use of buzzwords is a regular occurrence (Okoli, Schabram 2010, 7). 
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According to Levy and Ellis (2006, 190), changes and maturation in the terminology 
should be taken into account. The initial search for this study was made with search 
terms such as “cloud computing” and “cloud computing risks”. The initial search helped 
to narrow down to the following list of search terms: 
• Cloud computing risks 
• Cloud computing security 
• Cloud computing threats 
• Cloud computing vulnerabilities 
• IaaS risks 
• PaaS risks 
• SaaS risks 
The following library databases were used to conduct the search as they are generally 
deemed to include high quality articles (Webster & Watson 2002, xvi; Okoli, Schabram 
2010, 19–20; Levy, Ellis 2006, 185–186). They also include all of the IS journals that 
belong to the “Basket of eight”, a group of highly reputable and high quality IS journals. 
• ABI/INFORM Global (ProQuest) 
• Business Source Complete (EBSCO) 
• Emerald Journals (Emerald) 
• JSTOR 
• SAGE Publications 
• ScienceDirect (Elsevier ) 
• SocINDEX with Full Text (EBSCO) 
• Springer LINK 
• Wiley Online Library 
• Google Scholar 
The question is how does one know when the literature search is finished? Levy & 
Ellis (2006, 192) note that at some point of the review the researcher will most likely 
start noticing similarity to earlier search results regarding argumentation and methodol-
ogies; familiar authors and studies start appearing in the search results more often and 
no significant new findings are made. That effect was also noticeable in the literature 
search for this study. Studies that were familiar and already listed in the review protocol 
started to represent the majority of the search results, i.e. on a result page of 10 articles 
6 articles were already accounted for. When most of the search terms started producing 
similar results the process was deemed finished. A total of 79 Articles were discovered 
in the search process, 72 of which were included in the final review. 
When the pool of material for the actual review is ready, the criteria for the inclusion 
and exclusion need to be defined. These criteria do not assess the quality of the re-
viewed articles, only their relevance to the research questions (Okoli, Schabram 2010, 
21–22). In order to establish the reproducibility of the study, all the material should be 
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processed according to the same procedures, which is why Tranfield, Denyer & Smart 
(2003, 216-217) propose the use of forms for documenting the data extraction process. 
In this study, material that was at least partially focused on the risks in cloud compu-
ting, i.e. the abstract and the contents included mention of risks, threats, security or vul-
nerabilities, were included in the final review.  
2.3 Assessing the quality of the literature 
Tranfield et al. (2003, 216) and Rousseau, Manning & Denyer (2008, 13–19) present six 
different criteria for reviewing the literature: 
• Construct validity 
• Internal validity 
• Effect size 
• Generalizability 
• Intervention compliance 
• Contextualization 
The first two evaluate the construction and setup of the study, in terms of their ex-
planatory power. The third criterion, effect size, is the relationship between studied var-
iables, it is especially important in meta-analysis and in analyzing quantitative studies. 
Generalizability examines the claims in regard to their generalizability; whether a phe-
nomenon could be extended to other settings than the one specified in the study. The 
fifth criterion, intervention compliance, refers to the conditions under which the studied 
effects were recorded, and whether it is only a very specific set of conditions that pro-
duce similar results when applied. Finally, contextualization looks not only at the condi-
tions under which the effects were such as recorded, it also aims at providing infor-
mation as to why the conditions affect the results in a certain way. Okoli & Schabram 
(2010, 25–26) suggest on focusing on four aspects in assessing the quality: what does 
the study claim, how does it back up these claims, how relevant is the provided evi-
dence and finally, is the evidence grounded into practice. 
For this study, the quality was assessed based on these four criteria. The claims were 
analyzed, the studies evaluated according to these claims, and finally, the decision was 
made regarding the applicability of the study for this review. Of the 72 articles, alto-
gether 69 articles were deemed to be of sufficient quality to be incorporated into the 
literature review. 
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3 CLOUD COMPUTING 
To discuss the risks in cloud computing, it is important to have an understanding about 
what it is. To accomplish this, the background, development and current state of cloud 
computing is presented in this chapter, along with some of the technological develop-
ments that ultimately made cloud computing possible. The economic rationale behind 
cloud computing is also briefly discussed, as it is one major reason for the proliferation 
of the cloud computing and its transformation into the multi-billion industry it is today. 
3.1 Background 
In essence, cloud computing is a form of distributed computing, a computing paradigm 
where the computing resources are separated from their usage and might be physically 
dispersed. The early mainframe computers were the first instance of distributed compu-
ting. The big mainframes were hosted somewhere away from the users, who would ac-
cess the mainframes via the terminals that themselves didn’t have any computing capa-
bilities. The development of the first computer networks, ARPANET and Multics in the 
1960s allowed the remote use of computing resources (Foster et al. 2001, 51). The early 
visions of cloud computing were recorded around the same time, when MIT professor 
John McCarthy gave a speech at MIT’s centennial celebration in 1961. In his speech 
McCarthy envisioned that computing one day would be a utility just like the telephone 
system or the electricity grid, and that the users would pay for the computing resources 
per actual use. He went even further by stating that the computing utility could become 
a basis for an entire new industry (Garfinkel 2011, 74). 
Grid computing was a big step towards cloud computing. Grid computing is a model 
that was first introduced in the 1990s, and its idea is to bring together the computing 
power and storage capacities of several computers over a network using standardized 
protocols (Foster, Zhao, Raicu, & Lu 2008, 1–2). The result is a computing grid that is 
similar to a utility like electricity, similar to what McCarthy had envisioned three dec-
ades earlier. The focus of grid computing is on the physical storage and computing ca-
pabilities, which in the 1990s were the usual bottlenecks in performing tasks that re-
quire vast amounts of computing power. Such tasks were becoming increasingly more 
common at the time in some fields of science, so research institutions and governments 
were fast to adopt the model. According to Foster et al. (2008, 2), there are three charac-
teristics that can be specifically attributed to grid computing: central control over re-
sources that are not usually coordinated together; standard, open interfaces and proto-
cols; the services provided by the grid are specialized in nature. 
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While grid computing is effective in providing high computing capabilities for a spe-
cific purpose, its computing logic is batch and project oriented, which limits its interac-
tivity (Foster et al. 2008, 3-6). Grid computing is more suitable for one-off projects and 
ad hoc computing tasks, but less suitable for continuous use in a changing business en-
vironment. This limits the applicability of grid computing to a wider range of use, 
which is why its success has not reached far beyond the borders of the scientific com-
munity. 
As a simultaneous trend with grid computing, application service providing (ASP) 
started to emerge. It’s a concept of providing software applications to the users via a 
web interface, without the need to have the application installed on the user’s computer 
(Smith, Rupp 2002, 66). The advantages of the ASP model to companies are the ease of 
access to costly applications without a big commitment, faster implementation of new 
applications to business use and lowered overall cost, all while the company could focus 
on its core business instead of worrying about the technical aspects of the new technol-
ogy. The ASP paradigm also eliminates the need to deal directly with hardware and 
software vendors, thus lowering the barrier of adoption. This concerns especially ad-
vanced applications (Foster et al. 2001, 55). 
Key difference between ASP and cloud computing is that even though both service 
models are provided over the network, the ASP model is usually based on a more tradi-
tional approach where for each customer there’s a dedicated server (Krutz, Vines 2010, 
39). Thus the biggest advantage of the cloud, scalability, is not present. Another disad-
vantage of the ASP model is its bulkiness; there is usually little room for customization 
(Smith, Rupp 2002, 66–67). 
The advent of cloud computing in its current form could be attributed to the further 
development and proliferation of virtualization, a technology that has been around since 
the end of the 1960’s when it was first used on mainframes. By definition, virtualization 
is the process of creating a virtual representation of a physical computer (Zissis, Lekkas 
2012, 584). Virtualization separates the logical from the physical, enabling one physical 
computer to host multiple virtual computers. This is in contrast to the traditional model 
where each server is a physical, network-connected device consisting of processors, 
memory, hard drives and network components (Zissis, Lekkas 2012, 584). 
In the traditional model, the provisioning of a new server requires time, money and 
manpower, invested upfront. A new physical device is required, which might take time 
to get delivered; thereafter it needs to be installed, configured and launched. All these 
steps require skilled labor and resources. Virtualization, on the other hand, delivers a far 
simpler, faster and more cost-effective solution to the same requirement; if a properly 
configured virtual operating system image is available, the virtual machine can be 
launched instantaneously, with no upfront commitment and disposed of when it is no 
longer needed (Zissis, Lekkas 2012, 584). This flexibility is what makes virtualization 
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so prominent: the fast scalability and the ability to quickly provision a large pool of re-
sources with a minimal need for interaction and then discard those resources once no 
longer needed make virtualization very attractive in comparison to the traditional com-
puting model (Fox et al. 2009, 1). This is especially important for a growing company, 
as the forecasting of demand for computing is difficult and the infrastructure could be-
come a hindrance to growth. According to Krutz & Vines (2010, 23), some of the main 
benefits that virtualization provides are: 
• Usage-based billing 
• Fast scalability 
• Economies of scale 
• Location independence 
• Resilience to hardware failures 
• Eased mobility of applications within data centers 
Virtualization makes it possible to maximize the utilization rate of computing re-
sources, both for the cloud computing provider and the cloud customer. The customer 
can quickly dispose of extra capacity, whereas the cloud service provider can maximize 
the use of resources by hosting multiple customers on the same physical resources 
(Krutz, Vines 2010, 57). A survey examining 6 corporate data centers revealed that the 
average resource utilization rate ranged from only 10% to 30% on servers and only 5% 
on workstations (Marston et al. 2011, 176). According to Fox et al. (2010, 5) the operat-
ing costs of large data centers (10000 computers or more) are very low, between 14% 
and 33% of the operating costs of a medium-sized data center (between 100 and 1000 
computers). Cost advantages of this magnitude favor large cloud computing providers 
such as Google, eBay, Amazon and others. In addition to the financial muscle they 
have, a critical success factor is that during the dotcom boom in the early 2000’s many 
of those companies already made large-scale investments in suitable hardware infra-
structure, scalable database infrastructure and had the knowledge how to efficiently op-
erate such infrastructure (Fox et al. 2009, 5). 
When the high resource utilization rate enabled by virtualization is combined with 
the economies of scale that are gained from operating large data centers, the benefits of 
large scale virtualized computing come clear: compared to the traditional model, where 
companies host the servers in-house, cloud computing is capable of providing clear cost 
benefits. However, the cost advantage is not only beneficial for the cloud provider; it is 
equally beneficial for the cloud service customers who enjoy lower prices for compu-
ting services. At the same time they can focus on their core business, avoid big invest-
ments in infrastructure and its costly upkeep and still get the necessary computing ser-
vices. 
These computing models, combined with the rapid development of reliable high-
speed Internet connections have paved the way for companies to adopt new models for 
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arranging their business computing needs. The major drivers behind this development 
are the focus on efficient use of computing resources and the need to quickly adapt to 
new business requirements and changes (Marston et al. 2011, 177). Fox et al. (2010, 6–
7) argue that a shift in web services paradigm was a major driver behind cloud compu-
ting. They describe it as a shift from services requiring high levels of commitment and 
tight relationship between the service provider and service user to relationships where 
there is little commitment and interaction between the two. Paypal and Google AdSense 
are good examples, as they enable individuals or entrepreneurs to accept credit card 
transactions online, without negotiating a contract to do so with a credit card company, 
or a small web page host to make money with the help of ads on their web page, without 
having to hire an advertising agency for the job. 
3.2 The definition of cloud computing 
Cloud computing is a widely and loosely used term, and there are conflicting views on 
what it really is. It is sometimes considered a marketing term used to sell existing tech-
nology; that the only true novelty of the cloud is its name (Fox et al. 2009, 3). The rea-
son for the confusion is the nature of the term; it is an umbrella term covering various 
technologies, service models and approaches to information systems architecture. 
Vaquero, Rodero-Merino, Caceres & Lindner (2008, 1) address some of that vagueness 
to the hype surrounding cloud computing. 
One of the most widely cited definitions for cloud computing is provided by the U.S. 
National Institution of Standards and Technology (NIST). They define cloud computing 
as a computing model that enables omnipresent, on-demand access over a network to a 
pool of flexible computing resources that can be rapidly taken into use and then aban-
doned, with little human intervention (Mell, Grance 2011, 2). Foster et al. (2008, 1) de-
fine cloud computing as a distributed computing model that effectively utilizes econo-
mies of scale in provisioning a pool of virtualized, dynamic and scalable computing 
power and storage space to provide platforms and services to customers on demand over 
the network. Fox et al. (2009, 4) have listed three key properties unique for the cloud, 
from the user’s perspective: endless supply of resources at disposal, the gradual addition 
of resources according to true usage without any initial commitment, and granular bill-
ing of the resources used, e.g. by the hour or by the day. Zissis and Lekkas (2012, 584-
585) list the key characteristics required of cloud computing as flexibility, scalability, 
network access, location independence, reliability, the utilizing of economies of scale 
and sustainability. Vaquero et al. (2008, 3) analyzed various different definitions for 
cloud computing and concluded: cloud is a pool of accessible, virtual resources that are 
dynamically configured and re-configured to respond to demand; the use of the re-
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sources is charged based on the service level agreements (SLAs). Finally, Buyya, Yeo, 
Venugopal, Broberg, & Brandic (2009, 4–5) conclude cloud to be a distributed, inter-
connected system consisting of virtualized computers that are dynamically deployed 
and presented as a resource to the customer according to the SLA. 
Some of these definitions emphasize the ubiquity of the services (Mell, Grance 
2011), some place emphasis on virtualization (Foster et al. 2008; Vaquero et al. 2008; 
Buyya et al. 2009). The pay-per-use model of billing, also called granularity of the ser-
vice is included in the definitions by Fox et al. (2009) and Vaquero et al. (2008). Zissis 
& Lekkas (2012) include reliability and sustainability; they argue that these two proper-
ties are essential to the cloud although they are the outcome from the other essential 
properties, mainly the pooling of resources. Apart from these slight variations in the 
definitions, they share the following elemental properties that define cloud computing: 
• Pooled, virtualized resources 
• High elasticity and scalability 
• Ubiquitous network connectivity and availability 
• On-demand, pay-per-use service 
• Monitoring and measured service 
• Economies of scale, optimal resource utilization 
Pooling of resources is made possible by virtualization; which also enables high elas-
ticity and scalability, making it possible to deploy resources when needed and discard 
them after use. Network connectivity makes the cloud available everywhere; combined 
with the on-demand, pay-per-use service model the entry barrier for the smallest players 
is removed, which democratizes the use of computing resources (Mather, Kumaraswa-
my & Latif 2009, 14). To make the granularity of the services viable, they are moni-
tored and measured; this enables higher resource utilization for the service provider, in 
turn enabling the economies of scale in the cloud. 
These are the key elements that define cloud computing in this study. However, these 
definitions don’t take a stance to the structure of the cloud nor the actual contents of the 
cloud service, as in what kind of services are actually provided. They neither define the 
target group to whom the services are provided; whether they’re available to public or 
just a limited group of customers. The apparently complex nature of cloud computing 
requires further categorization, and the next subchapter elaborates on these themes. 
3.3 Cloud service models 
Cloud computing can be classified into different categories, commonly referred to as 
service models (Mell, Grance 2011, 3; Vaquero et al. 2008, 2). These service models are 
based on the structure and contents of the cloud; the structure referring to the underlying 
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hardware and software infrastructure, the contents referring to the delivered services. 
The most widely used classification for cloud services is the SPI-model. The model di-
vides the cloud computing offerings into three different service models (Mell, Grance 
2011, 2–3): 
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
• Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
• Software as a Service (SaaS) 
The service models are built upon a complex structure that is composed of different 
layers of technology, which are interrelated and dependent on the lower-level layers; 
combined, these layers form what is called the cloud stack. The lowest level in the 
stack, infrastructure as a service entails storage, computing and communications; plat-
form as a service adds a development and deployment environment on top of that and 
finally software as a service delivers a usable application built on top of the infrastruc-
ture. One crucial differentiator between these layers in the stack is the level of abstrac-
tion they present to the cloud customer (Youseff, Butrico & Da Silva 2008, 1). The 
lower in the stack the service model is situated, the lower the level of abstraction to the 
customer. The level of abstraction can thus be used to differentiate and classify the 
cloud service models. Youseff, Butrico & Da Silva (2008, 3) present a layered model, 
depicted in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1 The layers in the cloud stack (Youseff, Butrico & Da Silva 2008, 4) 
This representation of the cloud stack extends the SPI-model by slicing the infra-
structure layer into further layers. At the bottom of the stack are the hardware and firm-
ware, which are the physical and technological backbone of the cloud. Together they 
form the most basic service model, hardware as a service (HaaS), which has the smallest 
degree of abstraction of all service models (Youseff, Butrico & Da Silva 2008, 5–7).  
19 
The HaaS model could be utilized by big organizations, which want full control over 
the resources. The biggest difference between IaaS and HaaS is that IaaS is a multi-
tenant model, meaning that the resources are shared between different cloud customers 
whereas HaaS provides dedicated infrastructure for one single customer (Egwutuoha et 
al. 2013, 3). 
The next layer in the stack, software kernel could be an implementation of a hypervi-
sor or and operating system kernel, depending on what kinds of services are provided. 
On top of the kernel layer is the cloud software environment, which is divided into 
computational resources (IaaS), storage (DaaS) and communications (CaaS). This layer 
provides virtualized resources to the higher-level service models (Youseff, Butrico & 
Da Silva 2008, 5–6). It could be argued whether the separation of IaaS into IaaS, CaaS 
and DaaS is necessary, as nearly all definitions for IaaS include processing, storage and 
networking capabilities (Mell, Grance 2011, 3; Vaquero et al. 2008, 2; Zissis, Lekkas 
2012, 584). 
The cloud software environment, or PaaS is the next level of abstraction in the cloud 
stack. This service model provides the cloud customer with an application programming 
and deployment environment, where they can develop and run applications. 
The top layer in the cloud stack is the SaaS level, which is the most sophisticated 
layer and has the highest level of abstraction (Youseff, Butrico & Da Silva 2008, 3–4). 
Lenk, Klems, Nimis, Tai & Sandholm (2009, 2–3) present quite a similar division in-
to service models, which is also based on the SPI-model. They use the same basic divi-
sion into infrastructure, platform and services, further dividing those components into 
subcategories such as resource sets, services and environments. They also add an extra 
layer to the SPI model called HuaaS; Human as a Service. This layer refers to the way 
some services utilize their user base to further improve the services by way of 
crowdsourcing. However, as this level mainly refers to consumer-grade services, it can 
be deemed irrelevant for this study (Lenk et al. 2009, 4). 
Armando Fox et al. (2009, 4) have disputed the SPI-model, stating that there is no 
universal agreement on the contents of the models; instead they argue that the categori-
zation should be made based on the level of abstraction to the cloud service customer 
and the degree to which the services are managed. Based on the systematic review of 
the literature, specifically the newer studies, it could well be argued that there is a uni-
versal agreement on the SPI-model (Mell, Grance 2011, 3; Zissis, Lekkas 2012, 548). 
Moreover, as the categorization by Youseff et al. (2008) demonstrated, the SPI model is 
based on the level of abstraction, contrary to what Fox et al. argue. Although some addi-
tional layers and more fine-grained divisions into different service models are present-
ed, e.g. Youseff et al. (2008), the SPI-model model itself is so widely accepted and 
prevalent in literature that it will be used as a basic categorization in this study. 
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The service models in the SPI-model all have different purposes and different scope. 
IaaS has the capability of hosting a vast array of different operating systems and custom 
applications; the possibilities of PaaS are often limited to the offerings of its own devel-
opment platform and SaaS is limited to a single application or a collection applications 
(Fox et al. 2009, 8). Not only are the contents of service models different, also the re-
quirements facing the cloud customer are very different between the models. Different 
models require different skillsets from the customer; to effectively utilize IaaS or PaaS, 
more technical knowledge and specific skills are required than using SaaS. 
3.3.1 Infrastructure as a service 
Infrastructure as a Service can be seen as the most basic form of cloud computing, in the 
sense that it presents the lowest level of abstraction to the cloud customer. The IaaS-
model provides the customer with the basic infrastructure needed to run software, con-
sisting of computing resources, storage space and networking capabilities, which enable 
the deployment of various applications; including operating systems (Mather et al. 
2009, 22). As is imperative to the cloud paradigm and the realization of its promises of 
flexibility and fast scalability, these infrastructure resources are virtualized. The cloud 
service provider is in control of the physical infrastructure below the virtualized level 
(Mather, Kumaraswamy & Latif 2009, 14, 22). This makes the IaaS model much sim-
pler and more flexible to the customer compared to running the servers in-house, as 
there are less concerns over the technology and its upkeep. It also takes away the need 
for the long-term resource planning and the related costs (Bhardwaj, Jain & Jain 2010, 
62). In some cases the customer might have limited control over some networking re-
sources such as firewalls (Zissis, Lekkas 2012, 584). 
Despite the delegation of the physical infrastructure management to the service pro-
vider, the IaaS customer is wholly responsible for the software infrastructure, deploy-
ment and management of applications, in a similar manner as running a traditional data 
center (Bhardwaj, Jain & Jain 2010, 62). This is why the IaaS-model requires the most 
technical the knowledge from the cloud customer. Depending on the choices regarding 
the operating system and the deployment environment, very specific skillsets might be 
required to successfully utilize all the potential of the infrastructure. 
Lenk et al. (2009, 1–3) divide the lowest-level virtualized resources into a physical 
resource set and a virtual resource set, which form the basis for the virtual cloud infra-
structure. The reason these service sets are divided into physical and virtual is to enable 
the automated management of both physical and virtual resources. These resource sets 
enable the automated ramp-up and ramp-down of operating systems, network configura-
tions and other capabilities required to run the virtual infrastructure; they provide an 
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interface between the virtualized computational resources and the higher-level services. 
Examples of physical resource sets are Emulab and iLO, examples of virtual resource 
sets are Amazon EC2, Eucalyptus and OpenNebula  (Lenk et al. 2009, 2). On top of 
these resource sets are the infrastructure services, which are divided into basic infra-
structure services and higher infrastructure services. These services form the basis for 
running cloud applications; they entail the operating system and the application de-
ployment environment (Lenk et al. 2009, 2). 
The cloud customer might purchase applications from an external vendor or do some 
in-house development on their own, but in both cases they are responsible for the run-
ning of the applications. One benefit of this model is that the cloud customer doesn’t 
necessarily have to do extensive modifications to their existing software in order deploy 
them from the cloud, which makes the implementation process of software much quick-
er (Mather, Kumaraswamy & Latif 2009, 22). Advantages of the IaaS model over the 
traditional model are its high scalability; the resource redundancy it provides and the 
separation of data storage and data usage  (Brian et al. 2012, 9). 
Amazon EC2 and Simple Queuing Service; Rackspace Mosso Cloud Servers and 
GoGrid Cloud Storage could be defined as examples of IaaS services. Amazon Sim-
pleDB and S3; 10 Gen MongoDB and Hadoop HBase are examples of database services 
on the cloud, based on IaaS (Lenk et al. 2009, 4). 
3.3.2 Platform as a service 
From the technical perspective, platform as a service is a more complex set of services 
than IaaS. In addition to providing the same basic cloud infrastructure as the IaaS-
model, the PaaS-model also provides a development platform for developing and de-
ploying applications. The cloud service provider is responsible for the physical network, 
servers and the operating system (Zissis, Lekkas 2012, 548). 
Mather, Kumaraswamy & Latif (2009, 20) and Krutz & Vines (2010, 40) list the fol-
lowing requirements for PaaS: 
• Browser-based development tools 
• Integrated development environment to streamline testing and debugging 
• Integration with external databases and services 
• Inherent support for scalability and reliability, enabled by automation 
• Extensive monitoring capabilities, usage-based billing 
According to Giessmann et al. (2014, 966) the PaaS development platform is the lay-
er between the IaaS and SaaS; it connects the two layers. It does so by providing a pro-
gramming environment and an execution environment, and it usually supports a specific 
programming language, framework and API (Application Programming Interface). The 
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platform usually incorporates a collection of different tools, programming languages 
and libraries that enable the cloud customer to develop their own applications on the 
cloud platform, or use available software that has been developed with the programming 
languages and libraries that the platform supports (Mell, Grance 2011, 2-3). 
Compared to web development in general, PaaS greatly increases the number of 
available and able developers. As developing online applications from scratch requires a 
great deal of skills ranging from backend development to website configuration, PaaS 
removes the requirement to have these skills. The platform offers modular blocks of 
different functionalities, which can be combined to build new services and web applica-
tions (Mather et al. 2009, 19). Thus the PaaS developers don’t need to know much 
about the details of the infrastructure, they only need to familiarize themselves with the 
API that the platform provides and to be able to work with that (Mather, Kumaraswamy 
& Latif 2009, 20). 
Commonly the platform services are built around the offerings of only one cloud ser-
vice provider, and due to this restraint cover a vast array of different needs of the cloud 
customers. This has a potential to create a vendor lock-in, which causes inflexibility and 
lack of portability of the applications between different runtime environments (Brian et 
al. 2012, 10). However, some cloud service providers support interoperability, thus 
making it possible to combine the services of multiple cloud service providers. This 
enables the cloud customer to use the best possible tools for a given purpose and thus 
not limiting their choices (Lenk et al. 2009, 5; Mather, Kumaraswamy & Latif 2009 15–
17). In addition to the programming language libraries and tools, the platform provides 
the developers with some common, shared services such as billing, user authentication 
and authorization. Examples of PaaS are the Google Apps Engine, Amazon Web Ser-
vices (AWS) and Windows Azure (Mather et al. 2009, 20; Boniface, Nasser, Papay, 
Phillips, Servin, Yang, Zlatev, Gogouvitis, Katsaros, & Konstanteli 2010, 2). 
3.3.3 Software as a service 
Technically, SaaS is the most complex service model with the highest level of abstrac-
tion to the cloud customer. This makes it also the simplest cloud service model to utilize 
for the customer: in SaaS a readily usable application is delivered to the customer over 
the network (Mell, Grance 2011, 2). As in the cloud generally, the cloud applications 
are accessed through a web interface, or sometimes a client application that is installed 
on the end-user’s device (Zissis, Lekkas 2012, 584). 
Usually the cloud customer is able to do some basic configurations and settings to 
the software to accommodate their specific requirements, they are also responsible for 
loading the initial data into the system (Brian et al. 2012, 9). The application itself is 
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hosted on the provider’s infrastructure, and the customer doesn’t have to mind about the 
infrastructure as it is fully managed by the vendor  (Mather et al. 2009, 18). 
The SaaS-model has the potential to significantly lower the software licensing costs 
and personnel costs of the cloud customer by delegating the ownership and management 
of the software to the cloud service provider. This is possible as the model separates the 
possession and the use of the software (Turner, Budgen & Brereton 2003, 39). The 
cloud service provider also benefits from having their applications running on their own 
infrastructure, as it significantly eases the oversight of the intellectual property rights; 
the risk of illegal copying of software is practically non-existent (Mather, Kumaraswa-
my & Latif 2009, 18). 
The term SaaS is sometimes used interchangeably with SOA, or service oriented ar-
chitecture. This confusion is understandable as the two models are closely related and 
both enable service delivery over the network. The difference is that SaaS is a model for 
software delivery whereas SOA is a model for software construction (Laplante, Zhang 
& Voas 2008, 46–47). 
The risk of vendor-lock in, which is also present in IaaS and PaaS to an extent, is 
significantly higher in SaaS. The root cause is the same, namely proprietary APIs and 
technologies, which could make it difficult for an organization to extract their own data 
from the cloud (Fox et al. 2009, 15). Even if the data could successfully be transported 
out of one service provider’s cloud, it would be in a proprietary form that might not be 
directly compatible with another service. This could further exacerbate the problem, as 
building new interfaces for data export and then modifying the data so it could be used 
elsewhere (ENISA 2009, 26). Another contributing factor to the lock-in problem is the 
high level of abstraction, which renders the underlying application infrastructure invisi-
ble to the cloud customer and thus keeps them in the dark regarding the structure of 
their data and the operating logic of the cloud applications. 
Due to its low barrier of adoption, the amount of available SaaS services has prolif-
erated in recent years. There’s a marketplace containing a very broad range of services, 
although in some particular kinds of applications the offerings are significantly broader. 
Benlian, Hess & Buxmann (2009, 366–367) studied the adoption of SaaS services, and 
found that companies are more likely to utilize a SaaS application for general, non-
strategic tasks such as office and collaboration tools, whereas utilizing SaaS for the 
more strategic business applications such as ERP was uncommon. Common examples 
of SaaS offerings are the Google Drive and Salesforce CRM offerings (Mather, Kumar-
aswamy & Latif 2009, 44). 
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3.4 Cloud deployment models 
As the cloud service models define what services are provided to the cloud customer, 
the cloud deployment models define where and by whom the cloud computing services 
are hosted. This is an important distinction, as the choice of the deployment model can 
have far-reaching consequences regarding the responsibilities between the cloud service 
provider and cloud customer; the availability of the services; or even the law that is be-
ing applied to the services (Mather et al. 2009, 31–33). The deployment models are 
functionally and technologically independent of the service models, although some 
combinations are more common than others; SaaS is usually deployed via the public 
cloud (Krutz & Vines 2010, 43). The most common way of defining the different de-
ployment models is the division into four different categories based on the degree of 
privacy and the user base of the cloud (Mell & Grance 2011, 3; Subashini & Kavitha 
2011, 2; Zissis &Lekkas 2012, 584): 
• Private cloud 
• Community cloud 
• Public cloud 
• Hybrid cloud 
Private cloud is exclusive to a certain organization; community cloud is exclusive to 
a group of organizations. Public cloud is open to all users and hybrid cloud is a combi-
nation of private and public cloud. Sometimes these models are further divided into in-
ternal cloud and external cloud; the distinction is made based on the location of the 
cloud infrastructure. Internal cloud is hosted within the perimeter of the organization; 
external cloud is hosted outside the perimeter (Krutz & Vines 2010, 53). On these di-
mensions private cloud is defined as internal and public cloud as external; hybrid cloud 
and community cloud fall somewhere in between (Mather, Kumaraswamy & Latif 
2009, 18). 
The deployment models have many practical implications to the cloud customers, 
mainly concerning privacy and security (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 9). Only the private 
cloud and community cloud can be wholly trusted regarding the access and consump-
tion of the services, as they are the only cloud deployment models where the cloud cus-
tomer or customers get a dedicated infrastructure. Hybrid cloud and public cloud are 
inherently untrusted, as the access to the cloud and the data will always be routed 
through public infrastructure. This presents the increased risk of the data being routed 
through a hostile infrastructure, posing a serious threat to the confidentiality and integri-
ty of the data (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 9). As the cloud computing is based on the ap-
plications and data residing in large centralized data centers away from organization’s 
own control, new threats to the security of the company data are introduced compared to 
the traditional data center architecture (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 2–3). Many of these 
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threats are related to the data security and technological security of the cloud, which 
will be analyzed in detail in chapter 4.3. 
Depending on the chosen deployment model and the chosen service provider, the 
company’s control over their own data and systems can be greatly reduced. There is 
also the possibility of the cloud service provider gaining too much leverage if they are 
the sole service provider or otherwise have extensive control over both the systems and 
the data, leading to a vendor lock-in (Zhao et al. 2010, 189). The risk of vendor lock-in 
and other risks related to the relationships between cloud providers and cloud customers 
will be presented in chapter 4.4. 
The deployment model affects the risks in cloud computing to some extent. The 
magnitude of these effects depends heavily on whether the deployment model is exter-
nal or internal, as defined by Krutz & Vines (2010, 53). Based on the literature review, 
however, the risks are more dependent on the service models rather the deployment 
models. Moreover, as specified in the research question RQ1, the focus in the study is 
on the risks in different cloud service models, not the deployment models. Due to these 
limitations, the deployment model -specific risks are shortly presented in combination 
with the relevant deployment model in the following subchapters, but they are not sepa-
rately addressed in chapter 4, when cloud-specific risks are presented in more detail. 
3.4.1 Private cloud 
A private cloud is by definition exclusive for a certain organization. Hosting a private 
cloud requires significant resources from an organization, as the required technology is 
expensive and running the infrastructure requires expertise. The private cloud can be 
hosted by the organization itself, an external service provider or a combination of both. 
The cloud infrastructure could be physically located at the user’s premises, at the ser-
vice provider’s premises or again a combination of both (Mell, Grance 2011, 3; Zissis, 
Lekkas 2012, 584). 
Mather et al. (2009, 24) further divide private cloud into dedicated cloud, community 
cloud and managed cloud. Dedicated cloud is hosted within the company perimeter and 
operated by the organization’s own staff; the community cloud is hosted on the premis-
es of a third party but owned and operated by a vendor and managed cloud is hosted on 
the organization’s premises but managed by a service provider. In this division the 
community cloud is defined to be a subclass of private cloud, as it is not open to the 
public. However, in this study it will be handled as its own, separate deployment model, 
according to the NIST definition (Mell, Grance 2011, 4) and it will be more thoroughly 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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Some of the security issues specifically linked to cloud computing and present in all 
other deployment models, such as the security issues in virtualization, are absent in the 
private cloud. When an organization hosts its own cloud on company premises, it faces 
the same security risks as the traditional infrastructure but no new threats are introduced 
only because resources are virtualized, as there are no unknown parties using the same 
infrastructure (Zissis & Lekkas 2012, 585). The oversight and control over the cloud 
infrastructure are very strong in private clouds, which in turn increases the level of secu-
rity in the cloud  (Mather et al. 2009, 23–24). 
However, these security advantages come at a cost, as the full potential of virtualiza-
tion cannot be reached. The economies of scale and high resource utilization can only 
be realized when the resource pool and the user base are large enough to enable the sta-
tistical multiplexing, or co-residency on the computing resources in a way that maxim-
izes the utilization rate (Fox et al. 2009, 5). The private cloud is by definition exclusive 
to one organization, which limits the user base and dictates that the infrastructure be 
scaled according to the estimated peak demand of that organization. To accommodate 
peak demand, the resources need to be overprovisioned, which automatically leads to 
the underutilization of resources during quieter times (Garrison, Kim & Wakefield 
2012). 
As a remark, it could be disputed whether private cloud even fulfills the definition of 
cloud computing. It consists of pooled, virtualized resources, but the elasticity and 
scalability is only limited to the maximum installed capacity; it is network-connected, 
the resources are provided on-demand and the services are monitored and measured; 
however, the economies of scale and optimal resource utilization are absent. Further, the 
private cloud is typically hosted in a traditional data center on company premises (Krutz 
& Vines 2010, 48). Due to the similarities to in-house infrastructure and the limitations 
stated in the end of chapter 3.4, the risks in private cloud are even less relevant to this 
study than the risks in other deployment models. Private cloud poses no unique security 
risks to organizations compared to the traditional model. 
3.4.2 Community cloud 
Community cloud is a form of similar to a private cloud regarding exclusivity. Instead 
of being exclusive to only one organization, it is used by multiple organizations. The 
motivations for sharing a private cloud infrastructure could stem from the shared needs 
of the organizations in the community (Mell, Grance 2011, 3). It could be that the com-
panies operate in a field with similar needs for security and redundancy in their IT infra-
structure; or that the companies share a need for certain kind of compliance (Zissis, 
Lekkas 2012, 584). 
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According to Krutz & Vines (2010, 46) the cloud should fulfill the following criteria 
in order to be called community cloud: 
• Openness  
• Community 
• Graceful failure 
• Convenience and control 
• Environmental sustainability 
The openness refers to being free from vendor and technology lock-in; community re-
fers to the communal ownership and shared responsibility. Graceful failure is the inde-
pendence of any single organization; the effects of possible outages in one organization 
are limited only to that entity and thus don’t hinder the availability of the cloud to oth-
ers. The convenience and controls refer to the distributed control over the resources; no 
single community member has excess power over the others. Environmental sustainabil-
ity is made possible by the concentration of resources to the community cloud, which 
lessens the need for the community members to run their own infrastructure (Krutz, 
Vines 2010, 47). The managing of the community cloud could be complex, due to tech-
nological complexity presented by the differences in IT infrastructure of the community 
members. 
3.4.3 Public cloud 
Public cloud is the most widely adopted form of cloud computing, usually when cloud 
computing is discussed the subject of that discussion is the public cloud. By definition, 
public cloud offers powerful, highly scalable computing resources to the public; or indi-
viduals or organizations who need computing services (Dillon, Wu & Chang 2010, 28). 
Public cloud is the most common of the cloud deployment models, and it’s the most 
common platform for providing SaaS. The two models are a natural fit, as SaaS is by 
nature suited to applications, which have a low barrier of adoption and a low level of 
commitment (Fox et al. 2009, 7). The popularity of the public cloud could directly be 
attributed to the prevalence of SaaS cloud offerings. Examples of public cloud are Am-
azon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google App Engine (Krutz, Vines 2010, 45). 
The responsibilities of different parties are clear in the public cloud: the service provider 
has full ownership and control over the infrastructure, deployment environment and 
applications (Dillon, Wu & Chang 2010, 28). 
Public cloud is the deployment model that presents the most risks. Based on the divi-
sion by Krutz & Vines (2010, 53), it is the only deployment model that could strictly be 
defined external, meaning that the physical infrastructure lies wholly outside the organi-
zation’s safety perimeter. To add to this, multiple customers are using the same infra-
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structure, which causes problems regarding data security, locality, integrity and segrega-
tion; network security; authorization and authentication. The various security risks re-
garding virtualization also need to be taken into account (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 4). 
These risks will be more thoroughly discussed in chapter 4, based on the relevance of 
the risks to different service models (RQ1). 
3.4.4 Hybrid cloud 
Hybrid cloud is a combination of the previous cloud deployment models. It consists of 
at least two of them, but could also include all three (Krutz, Vines 2010, 49). The pri-
vate and public infrastructures that form the hybrid cloud are functional entities as such, 
but they are interlinked so that the applications on either infrastructure can connect to 
each other and thus enable load balancing and application portability (Mell, Grance 
2011, 3; Zissis, Lekkas 2012, 584). Usually organizations employ the isolated, private 
infrastructure to host the business-critical data and run their core infrastructure and ap-
plications, whereas the less critical applications can be deployed in the public cloud  
(Mather et al. 2009, 25). 
Hybrid cloud enables the rapid deployment of computing reserves from the cloud if 
there’s rise in demand. During normal levels of usage, the private cloud infrastructure is 
able to handle the load. However, in case of a sudden demand surge, the hybrid cloud’s 
ability to transfer a part of the load over to the public cloud enables the customer to 
handle the peak load without acquiring extra capacity. They can just provision the right 
amount of virtual servers from the public domain to perform an exceptionally heavy 
task and then release the servers back into the resource pool when the task is finished 
(Krutz & Vines 2010, 49). This inter-cloud load-balancing functionality is called cloud-
bursting, and it ensures the company only pays for the amount of computing power they 
actually use, thus minimizing the redundancy (Zissis, Lekkas 2012, 584). 
With the focus on the essential properties of the cloud, different cloud service models 
and deployment models, the aim of this chapter was to provide an understanding of 
what cloud computing is, how it can be distinguished from other forms of web services 
or hosted computing and how the cloud computing services are constructed. In the light 
of this understanding, the risks that are present in cloud computing can be put into the 
appropriate context and given the appropriate weight. 
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4 RISKS IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
4.1 The definition of risk 
This chapter aims to present different risks in cloud computing, each risk being part of 
the answer to the RQ1. In order to discuss these risks, it is first imperative to properly 
define what is meant by risk; what limitations the term possibly has and what other 
closely related terms are commonly used. The ISO 31000 -standard defines risk as the 
effect of uncertainty on objectives (Purdy 2010, 882). The objectives are the goals set 
by an organization; uncertainty is the effect of external and internal forces that the or-
ganization is not in total control of. This definition of risk simplifies the risk manage-
ment to an optimization process that enhances the likelihood of the organization of 
reaching its goals (Purdy 2010, 882). 
Kaplan & Garrick (1981, 12) present a twofold definition for risk. The first compo-
nent, uncertainty + damage depicts the uncertainty related to risks; that they can never 
be accurately predicted and they by definition include a potential of harm or damage. 
The second component of risk evaluates the relationship between a potential hazard and 
the safeguards in place to prevent that hazard from realizing; the risk magnitude is di-
rectly related to both. Stoneburner, Goguen & Feringa (2002, 8) and Grobauer, Wal-
loschek & Stöcker (2011, 50) define risk as a function of a potential threat utilizing a 
vulnerability and the resulting negative impact on the organization. In all of these defi-
nitions, risk is a composition of different elements. There is uncertainty and damage; 
there are threat or risk sources; vulnerabilities and threats. To properly discuss risks in 
cloud computing, it’s important to understand what these elements are and how they 
interact with each other. 
Stoneburner, Goguen & Feringa (2002, 15) define vulnerability as a weakness in sys-
tem design, implementation, security procedures or internal controls. According to Gro-
bauer et al. (2011, 50), vulnerability is the likelihood that an asset cannot resist the ac-
tions by a threat agent. When a threat agent uses such force that exceeds the object’s 
capability to resist that force, the object is vulnerable. Threat is then the potential of a 
threat source to exploit, either accidentally or with intent, a specific vulnerability 
(Stoneburner, Goguen & Feringa 2002, 12). Stoneburner et al. (2002, 13) define threat-
source as a circumstance or event that has the potential to cause harm to information 
systems. The ISO 31000-standard defines risk source as an element that has intrinsic 
potential to increase risk (Leitch 2010, 888). Grobauer et al. (2011, 51) argue that the 
damage caused by the realization of threats doesn’t differ at all in cloud computing 
compared to the traditional infrastructure. The loss of customer data has similar nega-
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tive consequences to the organization regardless of their chosen method of providing 
their IT infrastructure. 
A detailed view of risk is presented by Grobauer et al. (2011, 51). It takes into ac-
count the risk sources on the left hand side and the potential damage caused by these 
risks on the right hand side in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 The contributors to and effects of vulnerabilities and threats (Grobauer, Wal-
loschek & Stöcker 2011, 51) 
The loss event frequency is a function of vulnerabilities and threat event frequency. 
Vulnerabilities are affected by the magnitude of the threat they pose to the organization 
and the controls in place to minimize their effect. The threat event frequency depicts 
how often there are attempts to exploit existing vulnerabilities. This frequency is affect-
ed by a combination of the attackers’ motivations and their potential gain from the at-
tack. It’s important to note that threat events cannot be accurately predicted or con-
trolled whereas vulnerabilities can be treated or their effects minimized (Grobauer, Wal-
loschek & Stöcker 2011, 51–52). Based on these definitions, risk is the outcome of mul-
tiple factors. Risks are caused by known and unknown vulnerabilities and their effects 
on the organization but risks can also emerge from the relationship between the service 
provider and cloud customer. In other words, a risk can also exist independent of vul-
nerabilities. 
Grobauer et al. (2011, 52) debate vulnerabilities that are specific to cloud computing; 
they argue that for a vulnerability to be cloud-specific it needs to: 
• Be an inherent part of the technology that enables cloud computing 
• Have its cause in one of the essential characteristics of the cloud 
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• Have its cause in the incompatibility between established security controls and 
cloud computing 
• Be universal in modern cloud computing offerings 
To exemplify, when virtualization is utilized within the organization’s safety perime-
ter to deploy virtualized resources, it doesn’t pose any new risks compared to the exist-
ing infrastructure, as the safeguards in place to protect the traditional IT infrastructure 
also protect the virtual resources. However, when the virtual resources are deployed on 
a public, shared infrastructure, multitenancy introduces vulnerabilities. VM hopping is 
the event of gaining access from one VM to another VM running on the same host ma-
chine; VM mobility is the event of unauthorized copying of the data on VM disks over 
the network (Tsai, Siebenhaar, Miede, Huang, & Steinmetz 2012, 34–35). Another ex-
ample of cloud-specific vulnerability is the availability of the cloud services. The cloud 
customer has little control over an event or incident that affects the service provider’s 
infrastructure. Thus, they rely completely on the service provider to shield the cloud 
from denial of service (DoS) attacks (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 7). A third example is 
data lock-in in SaaS; the proprietary cloud applications might pose challenges for ex-
porting the customer data out of the cloud, thus increasing the vendor’s leverage and 
increasing the risk of data lock-in (Brender, Markov 2013, 729). 
As the technology behind cloud computing is complex, so are the risks. SaaS pre-
sents different security challenges to the cloud customer than IaaS simply for the reason 
that in SaaS the customer has far less control over their data; they might not even know 
where their data is physically stored or which other companies use the same physical 
storage (Kaufman 2009, 62). As another example, the concern of data lock-in is present 
in all service models but much more relevant to SaaS than for IaaS. The cloud customer 
has far less control over the infrastructure and their data in SaaS as they would have in 
IaaS, for example (Jansen, Grance 2011, 3–4).  A third example is the use of third-party 
applications and services. It is possible in PaaS, but in such cases part of the responsibil-
ity for securing the services is shifted to the third party, which adds complexity to the 
cloud infrastructure. The cloud service provider might also be unwilling to expose de-
tails of the security controls in their cloud due to the possibility of the information leak-
ing to the third a party with malicious intent. This further reduces transparency and trust 
in cloud (Mather, Kumaraswamy & Latif 2009, 56). The complexity of cloud technolo-
gy and the risks that it poses are depicted in Figure 3, which shows the cloud deploy-
ment models, service models and the essential properties of the cloud as a stack, along 
with different risk sources. 
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Figure 3 The complexity of the cloud security (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 2) 
On the right hand side different security concerns are presented, aligned with the 
parts of the cloud that are relevant to each security concern. The cloud deployment 
models have an impact on data security, whereas the service models have more rele-
vance to data transmission and application security, the essential characteristics of the 
cloud pose (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 5, 7). Naturally, this is only a simplified picture of 
the risks in cloud computing; nonetheless, it gives a good idea of all the factors in play 
when assessing the risks in cloud computing. 
Vaquero, Rodero-Merino & Morán (2011, 18) argue that many of the concerns relat-
ed to cloud computing are in fact well known risks that have prevailed for long in web 
services and data hosting services, and are not in any way exclusive to the cloud. Ra-
ther, it is how cloud computing combines mature technologies with new, innovative 
approaches to provide services to customers what makes the risk landscape of the cloud 
unique. 
In the following subchapters various risks and security concerns in cloud computing are 
discussed. These risks and concerns are grouped thematically, and the subchapters take 
no stance to the relevance of the particular security concern or risk to the cloud service 
model or deployment model. The relationship between the risks and the service models, 
as defined in the RQ2, will be discussed in detail in chapter 5. The deployment model 
has implications for the risk on a general level, in the sense that private cloud has as 
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high a degree of security as the organization’s safety perimeter and safety measures 
allow, i.e. the risk level is the same as it is for in-house infrastructure run by the same 
organization (Mather, Kumaraswamy & Latif 2009, 23). Also, as discussed in chapter 
3.4.1, the risks of private cloud and traditional infrastructure don’t differ much from 
each other. 
Public cloud, on the other hand, has more security concerns, as it faces the public In-
ternet and thus provides much more attack surface and more security risks; this notion 
shifts the emphasis of the risk analysis onto the public-facing deployment models. This 
justifies the discussion of the risks in cloud under the assumption that the deployment 
model is a public one, i.e. public cloud, community cloud or hybrid cloud. The aim in 
the following subchapters is to provide an answer to RQ1. 
4.2 Risks to data security and privacy 
Perhaps the most serious concern companies face when moving their services to the 
cloud is the security of their data (Fox et al. 2009, 15–16). As the data crosses the tradi-
tional enterprise boundaries, it is no longer subject to the company’s physical security 
measures such as control of physical access to company locations, or the technical secu-
rity measures protecting the information systems (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 4). Accord-
ing to Kaufman (2009, 62), the cloud obfuscates not only the location of the data, but 
also the co-tenants, or other organizations, which store data on the same physical stor-
age. To ensure information systems security, the threats need to be identified and rele-
vant measures taken to prevent the risks caused by the threats from realizing. According 
to Von Solms & Van Niekerk (2013, 2) information security is the process of ensuring 
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. Data security is a subset of 
information security, so the same requirements apply. A very common way of catego-
rizing data security is the division into confidentiality, integrity and availability of data  
(Von Solms, Van Niekerk 2013, 2). 
4.2.1 Data confidentiality 
The first element, confidentiality, means that only such parties and systems, which have 
specifically been granted access to confidential data, can access that data (Zissis, Lekkas 
2012, 586). The cloud presents additional challenges to data confidentiality. The open-
ness of the public cloud means there are multiple users for the same resources, thus in-
creasing the risk of unauthorized access. Due to the sheer volume of data and transac-
tions, also the security measures need to be capable of handling much more data than in 
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a traditional infrastructure. There could also be confusion regarding responsibilities if 
the cloud is hosted by multiple organizations; this could hurt the ability to quickly react 
to security threats. Finally, as virtualization obfuscates the resources and the infrastruc-
ture boundaries, it is difficult to identify and then isolate a resource in case of a data 
breach (Chen & Zhao 2012, 648). 
The confidentiality of data is also subject to legal considerations. This is especially 
true for public cloud services and sensitive data that are strictly regulated, such as finan-
cial information or health data. An example of such regulation is the PCI DSS (Payment 
Card Industry Data Security Standard), which is a set of requirements regarding infor-
mation storage and auditability (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 7). Another example is the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which regulates the ac-
cess to and handling of health information in the US (Fox et al. 2009, 15). 
The high degree of automation in the cloud combined with the complexity of the lay-
ered infrastructure introduces technical vulnerabilities such as interception of data in 
transit and session highjacking, which could lead to privacy breaches (Zissis, Lekkas 
2012, 587). In general, the complexity greatly increases the attack surface in the cloud, 
and the cloud access technologies such as SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) or 
REST (Representational State Transfer) present additional vulnerabilities (Almorsy, 
Grundy & Müller 2010, 5). These technological vulnerabilities will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 4.3 Due to these risks, a key element of data confidentiality is 
encryption. Companies might store their data unencrypted within their own security 
perimeter, but in the cloud that poses massive risks to data security. This is why strong 
encryption is vital, especially in the public cloud (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 4). 
According to Grobauer, Walloschek & Stöcker (2011, 52), web services and cryptog-
raphy, which are essential technologies to the cloud, have multiple vulnerabilities. Web 
technology is vulnerable in regard to session handling; and the array of different web 
protocols pose many vulnerabilities, which could lead to data leaks. The risks presented 
by the vulnerabilities in web technologies will be more thoroughly discussed in chapter 
4.3.2. Data confidentiality could also be compromised due to nonexistent encryption, or 
because of the breach of a weak cryptographic algorithm. In addition to the access au-
tomated systems have to the data, the cloud service provider might also have elevated 
privileges to the cloud in order to do their job. These privileged accounts present yet 
another threat to the confidentiality of the company data. These vulnerabilities make the 
auditing and monitoring of data creation, modification and deletion a vital part of the 
cloud security (Takabi, Joshi & Ahn 2010, 26). A closely related theme to data confi-
dentiality is data privacy; the protection of the former also protects the latter and vice 
versa. Data privacy will be discussed separately in chapter 4.2.5. 
35 
4.2.2 Data integrity 
The second component of data security is data integrity. It can be achieved by ensuring 
that all processes that modify the data take into consideration the atomicity, consistency, 
isolation and durability of the data, also referred to as ACID (Vogels 2009, 41–42). To 
ensure this, it is imperative that only those who are authorized can access the data and 
modify it. It is equally important to differentiate in which ways particular users can 
modify the data; some users have more privileges than others (Zissis, Lekkas 2012, 
586). A prerequisite for preserving the integrity of the data is rigorous access control 
along with proper handling of data backups (Kaufman 2009, 62). 
According to Subashini et al. (2011, 5), a stand-alone database can ensure the ACID 
and thus the integrity of data with the help of different constraints and transactions in 
the database. The process becomes much more complex in the cloud. Distributed sys-
tems use transaction managers to ensure the data integrity during transactions and modi-
fication of data, but this doesn’t suffice in the cloud environment. Vogels (2009, 40–41) 
argues that the complexity and the high availability of the cloud combined with the 
massive amounts of requests present many technical challenges to the consistency of the 
data; sometimes trade-offs must be made between durability, availability and consisten-
cy of the data. 
Browser access is the modus operandi of the cloud. It could create problems with the 
management of the data integrity, as some web protocols such as HTTP or HTTPS (Hy-
pertext transfer protocol) don’t support transactions. This might lead to the integrity 
management having to be dealt with on the API level (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 5). Due 
to the lack of standards, this approach is problematic. It might lead to situations where 
the data integrity is ensured on the database level but the application level is entirely 
surpassed in the process. Depending on the internal logic of the application, this might 
present serious problems regarding data integrity (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 5). 
4.2.3 Data availability 
The third component of data security is the availability of data. Being able to access 
business critical data at all times is one of the biggest concerns companies have when 
considering moving their data and applications to the cloud (Fox et al. 2009). In short, 
availability is the system’s ability to provide data and software to the users reliably re-
gardless of actual demand. By this definition, the high fluctuations in demand have to 
be accommodated by the cloud (Zissis, Lekkas 2012, 586 – 587). Venters & Whitley 
(2012, 186) argue that it is justified to expect the availability of the cloud to match or 
even exceed the availability of the equivalent in-house infrastructure. The high availa-
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bility is made possible by a thorough analysis of the actual demand for the cloud ser-
vices. 
Jansen & Grance (2011, 31) define the availability as the accessibility and usability 
of the organization’s resources. It could be temporarily reduced by way of a DoS attack, 
broken hardware or natural disasters; the aspect that causes the most worry to the organ-
ization is the unpredictable nature of these threat events. 
Usually the most concrete manifestation of the cloud computing availability is the 
service level agreement, or SLA, where the required weekly or monthly uptime of the 
service is defined (Ramgovind, Eloff & Smith 2010, 4). The availability needs to be 
taken into account already in the development phase, as the applications need to support 
high availability and scalability. The infrastructure needs to be multi-tiered, which is 
made possible by instances of virtual machines dispersed on different servers, managed 
by a load balancer. This significantly increases the resiliency of the infrastructure, and if 
such measures are not in place, it might severely undermine the availability of the sys-
tem (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 7). The dispersion of resources on different servers with-
in one data center helps to protect critical systems from hardware failures, but the data-
center itself is still vulnerable to external threats. Stoneburner, Goguen & Feringa 
(2002, 13–14) categorize common threat sources into natural threats, human threats and 
environmental threats. Natural threats include floods, earthquakes and the like. Human 
threats could be either intentional such as attacks over the network or planting of mali-
cious software; or unintentional like accidental removal of data. Environmental threats 
include power failures, pollution or leakage into the data center. Large providers like 
Amazon and Google offer their services based on multiple countries and continents, 
which significantly mitigates the effects of bigger outages that are a result of natural 
disasters or other unexpected events (Zhou, Zhang, Xie, Qian & Zhou 2010, 107). 
Jensen, Schwenk, Gruschka & Iacono (2009, 114) discuss different cases of flooding 
attacks that could lead to the cloud service becoming unavailable. Direct denial of ser-
vice attacks (DDoS) could utilize a vulnerability specific to cloud computing; namely, 
some services having only a single entry point. Once this entry point becomes flooded 
because of a direct attack and is rendered unavailable, the whole service could be down 
although there would still be available resources elsewhere in the cloud (Jensen et al. 
2009, 115). Indirect DoS present another kind of vulnerability that has its basis in the 
very nature of the cloud: utilizing the same infrastructure for multiple companies. An 
attack that targets one company could inadvertently affect the services of another com-
pany on the same cloud. The sophistication of the cloud technology could also pose an 
additional threat: some cloud services might try to automatically move the workload 
onto another server after the load balancer notes the increased load on the attacked serv-
er. If it succeeds, it only escalates the problem further, even though that was not the 
intent (Jensen et al. 2009, 115). 
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4.2.4 Data location 
One aspect of data security is the data location. Despite that, the cloud customer is often 
unaware of the exact location of their data, even the country in which the data resides 
might be unknown (Popović 2010, 347). The data location is especially relevant when 
sensitive and personally identifiable information (PII) is at stake, as such data is subject 
to stringent regulation regarding storage and deletion in many countries (Subashini, Ka-
vitha 2011, 5). A good example of such regulations is the European Union (EU) regula-
tions, which state that PII data need to reside within the geographical borders and thus 
within the jurisdiction of the EU. The regulations also place further restrictions are also 
on data transfer out of the EU area (Brender, Markov 2013, 728). 
In addition to regulation regarding data citizenship and residence, national laws can 
pose bigger threats to an organization’s data. For example, data seizure might be a real-
istic scenario if the data resides in a country where the legal framework allows such 
measures to be taken (Popović 2010, 345). Brender & Markov (2013, 728) also discuss 
the risk of such legislation that gives the government a vast access to an organization’s 
data, they mention the United States (US) Patriot Act as an example of such law. It 
gives the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) broad access to an organization’s data, 
provided that a court order is presented. This might have far-reaching consequences to 
the CIA of an organization’s data. 
Besides having a big legal impact, the data location also presents some practical 
challenges and implications to the cloud customer, specifically regarding the due dili-
gence in the cloud. On-site inspection of the physical location of the data cannot be car-
ried out if the data center is located in another country; performing an audit on a third-
party provider might also prove to be tricky (Kalyvas, Overly & Karlyn 2013, 20). 
As discussed in chapter 4.2.3, many cloud service providers disperse the data to mul-
tiple locations to achieve resiliency against different kinds of incidents and failures. 
According to Zhou et al. (2010, 111) this further exacerbates concerns in the cloud, as 
the applicable regulations are not clear to all parties. This regulatory complexity is espe-
cially true if there are multiple parties involved in providing the cloud service, e.g. a 
SaaS-vendor running their applications on top of Amazon’s cloud, instead of just one 
service provider being responsible for the whole service. The regulations don’t neces-
sarily take into account this complexity, which might risk the confidentiality of an or-
ganization’s data in case they end up in a courtroom (Zhou et al. 2010, 110). Thus, it is 
not irrelevant where the data is geographically located, even though it would have little 
impact on the functionalities and services in the cloud. 
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4.2.5 Data privacy 
Privacy is an elemental part of cloud computing security, and it’s an underlying theme 
in many discussions regarding risks in cloud computing. Katzan (2010, 8) defines pri-
vacy as the right of an individual or an organization to decide how, when and how much 
information about them is available to other parties. Mather et al. (2009, 146) further 
define this information, or PII, as any information that is related to a known or identifi-
able individual. To better understand the dynamics of the privacy in the cloud, Katzan 
(2010, 8) discusses different actors that have a role in the privacy domain in the cloud: 
• Subject 
• Beneficial user 
• Agency 
Subject is the natural or legal person whose data is being handled or stored; the bene-
ficial user is the party that gains value from the data, and the agency is the system or 
systems that process the data. The agency is neutral in its stance to the data; it merely 
performs the processing, whereas the subject and beneficial user both have an interest to 
the data. The subject and the beneficial user might, but don’t necessarily belong to the 
same organization (Katzan, 2010, 8). 
The subject, whether a natural or a legal person, usually wants to carefully control 
the privacy of their data, whereas the beneficial user might have an opposite incentive in 
order to maximize their possibilities for utilizing the data. This creates a conflict of in-
terest, which is the biggest in the free-of-charge consumer-grade SaaS offerings; cloud 
customers get free services by allowing the provider to utilize their data. However, as 
more organizations adopt such services to replace their in-house email servers or other 
business applications, this issue is very relevant for this study as well. 
According to Chakraborty, Ramireddy, Raghu & Rao (2010, 34), the risks related to 
privacy are a major concern in the cloud alongside security and business integrity. The 
cloud customers generally worry about the adequacy of privacy controls in the cloud, as 
they have only limited means to monitor and assure the privacy practices of the cloud 
vendors. The traditional approach to protecting data in information systems is to simply 
manage the access to the data, the methods for which will be discussed in chapter 4.3.3. 
These measures are still very relevant in the cloud, but in order to protect data privacy 
they alone are not sufficient. 
Due to the sensitive nature of PII, the cloud privacy is subject to many rules and reg-
ulations over the world. Zhou et al. (2010, 111) provide examples of the US regulation, 
such as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which regulates govern-
mental access to electronically stored communications, and the Gramm Leach Bliley 
Act (GLBA), which regulates the disclosure of financial information. These and many 
more US regulations explicitly limit certain use purposes of the data but otherwise give 
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broad freedoms to cloud service providers. The EU regulations, on the contrary are 
based on certain undisputed principles, which strictly limit the use of PII and its trans-
portation outside the borders of the EU (Mather et al. 2009, 155). A good example of 
such regulation is the EU-ruling also known as the “right to be forgotten”. It’s a 2014 
ruling by the EU Commission regarding the privacy of personal data, which mandates 
the cloud service providers to remove links to publicly available PII by request of the 
individual to whom it concerns. The requests can be placed once an individual considers 
the PII to be “inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive” (Factsheet on ruling C-
131/12, 2–3). 
The low degree of control in the cloud places additional requirements on the data 
privacy while the risk of unauthorized access is increased; the appropriate privacy pro-
tections need to be incorporated in all cloud security measures (Takabi, Joshi & Ahn 
2010, 28). Due to the obfuscation of infrastructure boundaries and the number of differ-
ent actors in the cloud, there is a need for more sophisticated methods of protecting the 
privacy of the data. Instead of protecting data only from outside access, the data should 
also be protected from within (Chow, Golle, Jakobsson, Masuoka & Molina 2009, 88). 
A data breach resulting in the loss of privacy can lead to significant adverse financial 
and reputational consequences to an organization (Mather, Kumaraswamy & Latif 2009, 
145). The protection of the data from within, as proposed by Chow et al. (2009, 88), can 
be achieved by using encryption. Encryption is a very effective tool for protecting the 
privacy of the data, but this effectiveness negatively affects the usability of the data, as 
performing computing operations, especially searching and indexing the data, is diffi-
cult when the data is encrypted. 
Yu & Wen (2010, 1) argue that the data security should be understood beyond the 
triad of confidentiality, integrity and availability or data storage and transmission secu-
rity; instead the whole data life cycle should be taken into consideration. They propose 
the following concept for the life cycle of the data: 
 
Figure 4 Data life cycle (Yu, Wen, 2010, 1) 
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In this model, the life cycle of data begins with the creation and thereafter the storage 
of the data. Once in storage, the data could be accessed and shared multiple times. The 
archival of data is used to store data that is not in active use but might still needed in the 
future. The final step of data life cycle is the destruction of data (Yu, Wen 2010, 2). 
This life cycle thinking could ease the data security management and data privacy, as by 
implementing data security functions an organization could get better assurance to the 
CIA of the data, especially after the data has been removed (Yu, Wen 2010, 3–4). 
Indeed, the end of the data life cycle, i.e. the destruction of the data could prove to be 
problematic, especially in regard to the data privacy. Mather et al. (2009, 149) discuss 
data retention and data destruction as big concerns regarding data privacy. The retention 
refers to the ownership of the data during its lifecycle; who owns the data and what 
happens to the data once the agreement between cloud customer and cloud service pro-
vider ceases. The data destruction is closely linked to data retention, as it is the next 
logical step in the data life cycle. However, it’s not always so easy to ensure that the 
data is truly destructed. The deletion of the data from a hard disk only releases the block 
where the data was stored instead of really removing the data. Overwriting the block, 
several times, could render the old data unusable; but there’s no guarantee of that 
(Mather et al. 2009, 153). Data remanence is a term that refers to what is left of the data 
after it has nominally been erased; it is the residue of the data. It could pose a serious 
threat to the data privacy, and as the cloud customer has no control over the physical 
infrastructure, the assurance of the actual destruction of the data is difficult (Zissis, 
Lekkas 2012, 586). Due to the multitenant nature of the cloud, the physical resources 
are shared between the cloud customers. Once the resources are no longer in use, they 
are released back into the resource pool to be used again, a practice called object reuse. 
This might enable malicious actors or other cloud residents to gain access to the residual 
data and thus compromise the privacy of the data (Zissis, Lekkas 2012, 586).  
The most certain way of destructing the data is the scrapping of the hardware that is 
no longer used. This is the cloud service provider’s responsibility, and although it is an 
industry standard to thoroughly erase data from hardware before it’s decommissioned; 
the customer has no way of ensuring that the hardware and thus the data have truly been 
destructed. This is why media sanitization by way of destructing hardware is not suffi-
cient or practical in the cloud context. To prevent the data ending up to the wrong 
hands, additional cryptographic measures are required (Grobauer, Walloschek & Stöck-
er 2011, 53). This way the access to the confidential data doesn’t compromise the priva-
cy of the data, as the encrypted data is unintelligible to all parties without the right cryp-
tographic keys (Mather et al. 2009, 153). 
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4.3 Technological security risks 
The different cloud technologies have been an underlying theme throughout the whole 
study. To further clarify: there is no isolated or clearly definable concept of cloud tech-
nology; the cloud consists of a combination of different, older and newer technologies 
that as a whole form the cloud. As the focus in study is on the risks in cloud computing 
in general (RQ1) and their relevance to different service models (RQ2), also the techno-
logical risks play an important role. However, as this is not a study in the area of tech-
nology but in the area of business, a very detailed insight into the technologies is out of 
scope. Thus the following subchapters present the risks related to the most crucial tech-
nologies enabling cloud computing, namely virtualization, web technologies and identi-
ty and access management technologies. 
4.3.1 Virtualization risks 
As shortly introduced in chapter 3.1, Virtualization is the technological backbone of 
cloud computing, making the dynamic provisioning of resources possible (Tsai et al. 
2012, 32). Virtualization is made possible by hypervisor, also known as a virtual ma-
chine monitor (VMM), which provides the technological platform for hosting virtual 
machines. Simultaneously, the hypervisor also enables multitenancy, which is defined 
as the running of multiple virtual machines on a single host computer (Brown, Ander-
son & Tan 2012, 1). Hypervisors can be divided into two groups based on their build 
type. Type 1 hypervisors are so-called bare-metal hypervisors, which access the hard-
ware resources directly. Type 2 is a virtual hypervisor, which runs on atop an operating 
system (Mather et al. 2009, 45–46). 
Due to its location at the bottom of the cloud stack, closest to the infrastructure, the 
hypervisor faces very stringent requirements regarding security. All processing opera-
tions performed in the cloud will be routed through the hypervisor, which make it a very 
significant single source of risk (Robinson et al. 2010, 29). The cloud customer has no 
visibility or access to this level of the cloud infrastructure, and they rely on the cloud 
service provider for the operations and maintenance. 
According to Vaquero, Rodero-Merino & Morán (2011, 7). As the hypervisor in-
cludes significantly less code than a full-fledged operating system, in theory its security 
is easier to verify and maintain than that of an operating system. However, the rapid 
development of new cloud offerings has made the VMMs somewhat more complicated, 
thus also complicating the security management. 
Vaquero et al. (2011, 3) analyze different security concerns to cloud computing with 
a specific focus on the virtual machines and networks. The key security concerns they 
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found were the security of the virtual machine (VM) images and the hypervisor. Indeed, 
the security of a single virtual machine in the cloud is crucial, as there are multiple dif-
ferent vulnerabilities that could stem from a compromised VM. 
Tsai et al. (2012, 34 – 35) present four different security issues present in virtualiza-
tion technology: 
• VM hopping 
• VM mobility 
• VM diversity 
• VM denial of service 
VM hopping means the use of one VM for gaining an illicit access onto another VM. 
Ristenpart, Tromer, Shacham, & Savage (2009, 2) studied two different threat scenarios 
that utilize vulnerabilities in the virtualization layer for VM hopping. The first scenario 
is a malicious actor attempting to compromise the data of any cloud customer without a 
specific the target; the second scenario specifies the target. They concluded that by us-
ing sophisticated probing, an attacker might be able to locate a particular cloud custom-
er with high certainty and arrange so that their virtual machine is located on the same 
physical device. This in turn enables gaining unauthorized access to cryptographic keys 
or performing an internal DoS attack. Ristenpart et al. (2009, 2 – 3) tested an access 
method called a side-channel attack, which utilizes information that is available without 
significant effort. It is also noteworthy that they only utilized the capabilities that were 
readily available in the cloud. 
VM mobility is the act of transporting a virtual machine from one physical host onto 
another host (Tsai et al. 2012, 35). This transportation process could be subject to a 
man-in-the-middle -attack, potentially compromising the confidentiality and integrity of 
the data. If the data is not properly encrypted, there are risks of the data being leaked or 
modified during the transport (Vaquero et al. 2011, 6). Due to the large scale of the 
cloud, the spreading of compromised VM images could greatly exacerbate the effects of 
this vulnerability (Tsai et al. 2012, 35). 
VM diversity refers to the various different virtual machine configurations in the 
cloud. Many traditional security mechanisms for virtualization work with the underlying 
assumption that the virtual machine image, also known as guest operating system is 
known and trusted. However, as only the cloud customer has control over the image, 
this is often not the case (Tsai et al. 2012, 32). The process of managing and transport-
ing virtual machine images to the cloud over insecure networks presents threats to the 
integrity of the OS image (Vaquero et al. 2011, 16). 
The last threat presented by Tsai et al. (2012, 35) is the VM DoS. In its simplicity, 
one VM uses up all the available resources, thus rendering all the other VMs residing on 
the same host unusable. 
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These vulnerabilities make it clear that the isolation and security management of vir-
tual machines is an essential part of secure cloud computing. On a shared infrastructure 
there is always the possibility that a party with malicious intentions is sharing the same 
physical resources. If a virtualization-related vulnerability is discovered, the malicious 
party could gain unauthorized access to the cloud and so threaten the confidentiality and 
integrity of the company data (Ristenpart et al. 2009, 2). 
Robinson et al. (2010, 29) identify two main areas of concern in virtualization securi-
ty: problems related to the isolation of vulnerabilities in configuring and deploying vir-
tual machines; and the applicability of the current security controls for virtualization in 
the cloud environment. Brown, Anderson & Tan (2012, 8) recognize various security 
threats stemming from virtualization: data isolation, side-channel attacks, unknown and 
potentially malicious actors sharing the same infrastructure, uncoordinated changes 
made in the infrastructure and the potential mixing up of data of different cloud custom-
ers. 
VM escape is an event where a virtual machine misconfiguration allows access to the 
physical host, which in turn enables running arbitrary code on the lowest level of the 
cloud stack. This way an attacker could bypass all the security measures in place on all 
levels of the cloud stack, creating a uniquely powerful security threat to all those using 
the same infrastructure (Krutz, Vines 2010). 
It could be concluded that virtualization presents many technical threats to cloud 
computing. It also presents many such threats that are not attributable to the relationship 
between the cloud service provider and the cloud customer. Instead, the threat comes 
from the direction of the other cloud customers. As the cloud customer has no way of 
knowing who is sharing the infrastructure with them, the security measures need to be 
in place to maintain confidentiality, integrity and availability of company data (Ris-
tenpart et al. 2009, 1). 
4.3.2 Risks in web technologies 
Ubiquitous access is present in all cloud service models, as defined in the essential 
characteristics of cloud computing. In practice this means that the services are always 
accessed over a network connection using a web browser (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 6). 
As discussed in chapter 4.1, certain vulnerabilities can be considered cloud-specific 
when they are a part of key cloud computing technologies or have their cause in one of 
the essential characteristics of the cloud, and web technology fulfills both of these crite-
ria (Grobauer et al. 2011, 52). 
Web technologies are an essential part of the cloud, and they include many vulnera-
bilities that present risks to cloud computing. Jensen et al. (2009, 111 – 115) discuss 
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these security concerns, among other technological security concerns, listing XML sig-
nature vulnerabilities and browser security as major concerns. Subashini & Kavitha 
(2011, 6) present a breakdown of security breaches based on the layer where the breach 
occurs; application layer was compromised in 39% of the cases. 
The Open Web Applications Security Project (OWASP) lists the top 10 security con-
cerns related to web technologies, periodically updating the list according to the devel-
opment of the risk landscape. The aim of the project is to raise awareness of the most 
common security risks, thus improving the web security as a whole (OWASP 2013, 1–
2). This list is a comprehensive overview of the risks in web technologies, the theme of 
this chapter, and these risks are well applicable to cloud computing (OWASP 2013, 4): 
• Injection vulnerabilities (SQL, LDAP) 
• Broken authentication and session management 
• Cross-site scripting 
• Insecure direct object references 
• Security configuration problems 
• Exposure of sensitive data 
• Missing access control on functional level 
• Forged cross-site requests 
• Usage of vulnerable components 
• Invalid redirects and forwards 
The injection vulnerabilities are caused by untrusted data being incorporated into a 
legitimate command that is executed, potentially causing multiple problems. Authenti-
cation and session management risks might lead to the compromising of passwords or 
keys that could be used in combination with other vulnerabilities, whereas cross-site 
scripting tricks the browser to use untrusted data, possibly leading to session high-
jacking or redirect to a malicious web page. Insecure object references might expose 
files or database keys to external parties; security misconfigurations often result from 
neglecting the defining and maintaining of security configurations and software patches 
and updates. Sensitive data exposure is possible if the data is not properly protected; as 
discussed in chapter 4.2, different security measures are needed to ensure the CIA of the 
data. Access control on a functional level is required to ensure that the commands exe-
cuted on the server side are valid; otherwise requests could be forged on the browser, 
further threatening the data security. Cross-site request forgery allows a malicious actor 
to generate requests from a victim’s browser, again compromising data security. Using 
vulnerable libraries, frameworks or software modules poses a serious threat, as it might 
enable an attacker to take over a whole server. Finally, the last on the list, invalid redi-
rects and forwards could direct the user to a malicious web site, creating a possibility of 
phishing or malware infection (OWASP 2013, 5–15). 
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This is by no means a comprehensive list of all web service vulnerabilities, there are 
many more risks and vulnerabilities present in web technologies. The list gives a good 
overview of the complexity and nature of the vulnerabilities that are an inherent part of 
the web technologies used in cloud computing. Many of the listed risks are related to 
web browser technology and web service frameworks, and Jensen et al. (2009, 114–
115) suggest that the strengthening of browser and framework security would greatly 
improve web security in general. Mather et al. (2009, 49–50) discuss the inadequacy of 
traditional perimeter security combined with network-based access controls, concluding 
that the approach works in a controlled environment but not in the public cloud where 
the risk level is significantly higher. To ensure web application security, the security 
measures need to be incorporated into the application design from the start. 
4.3.3 Risks in identity and access management 
Identity and access management or IAM is a concept that enables the identification of 
users and managing their access to resources. In addition to providing access, the other 
and equally important part of the IAM is to prevent unauthorized access (Jansen, Grance 
2011, 25). IAM also provides the capabilities for authentication, authorization and au-
diting. Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of the user, whereas au-
thorization verifies the privileges of the user. Auditing is the process of monitoring the 
authentication and authorization processes; it has a critical role in detecting unauthor-
ized access and possible breaches (Mathers, Kumaraswamy & Latif 2009 76–77). 
Subashini & Kavitha (2011, 8) divide the identity management into three subcatego-
ries: 
• Pure identity paradigm 
• User access paradigm 
• Service paradigm 
The pure identity paradigm entails only the creation, management and disposal of 
identities. No stance is taken on the access rights these identities have. The user access 
paradigm entails a user and a simple access to a system, and the service paradigm grants 
role-based online access to multiple services (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 8). The first two 
paradigms might be too coarse for the cloud as they make the principle of the least priv-
ilege difficult to implement. Without fine-grained assignment of rights, the risk of ex-
posing confidential data is increased (Grobauer, Walloschek & Stöcker 2011, 57). A 
role-based separation of access rights is widely regarded as the best practice for captur-
ing various requirements and policies under one access paradigm. It also ensures that 
the principle of the least privilege can be implemented (Takabi, Joshi & Ahn 2010, 27–
29). 
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Traditionally the organization has a clear boundary of trust, which is controlled and 
secured by the IT organization. The adoption of cloud computing challenges this clarity, 
as it extends the boundary over to the cloud service provider (Mather, Kumaraswamy & 
Latif 2009, 73). Identity and access management is a requirement for safe and secure 
cloud computing, so the IAM process needs to be extended to the cloud too. The easiest 
way to implement IAM to the cloud is to simply add another, independent IAM process 
for the cloud (Jansen, Grance 2011, 25). This duplicate maintenance of user identities 
and access rights is a risk source to an already complicated process (Mather, Kumaras-
wamy & Latif 2009, 76). 
Another way of implementing the IAM process to the cloud is the synchronization of 
credentials between the enterprise infrastructure and the cloud (Subashini, Kavitha 
2011). However, leveraging the existing IAM framework in the cloud is often difficult, 
as the cloud resides outside the company perimeter and because there is a lack of tech-
nical compatibility (Jansen, Grance 2011, 25). Different organizations that operate on 
the cloud have different security and privacy requirements, which necessitates the im-
plementation of various security mechanisms to fulfill these requirements (Takabi, Joshi 
& Ahn 2010, 26–27). Without proper orchestration, architecture and central governance 
the IAM process is prone to mistakes and poor quality of user data. High personnel 
turnaround, external partners and big amount of different user identities and procedures 
make the up-to-date management of identities a challenging process (Mather, Kumar-
aswamy & Latif 2009, 74). 
A third way of taking care of the IAM process is federated identity management  
(Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 8). This approach requires reliable and careful handling and 
separation of the identities to protect the data and to prevent the mix-up of cloud pro-
vider and cloud customer identities. The federated IAM could be implemented within 
the company perimeter or acquired from a service provider. The first approach lets the 
customer utilize the existing IT infrastructure and security measures, but it might cause 
overhead for maintaining identities that are not employees. The outsourcing approach is 
flexible especially if there are interfaces between corporate IT architecture and multiple 
different service providers, but the downside is the lack of transparency and control 
(Mather, Kumaraswamy & Latif 2009, 94–98). 
According to Grobauer et al. (2011, 56–57) the biggest risk sources in IAM are 
weaknesses in credential reset mechanisms, ineffective authorization checks, too coarse 
authorization and insufficient monitoring possibilities. Credential resets provide an ave-
nue for attackers to gain access to the cloud. Ineffective authorization checks pose risks 
to the confidentiality of data, as they might make data available to unauthorized parties 
using methods such as URL guessing. Coarse authorization control makes the separa-
tion of duties impossible. This leads to a risk of unauthorized users gaining too high 
privileges and thus gaining access to the cloud management interface. Finally, the lack 
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of proper monitoring and reporting makes the identification of all other threats difficult, 
which is very problematic to the information security of the cloud. 
4.4 Relationship risks 
In addition to the various technological and data security risks that are usually discussed 
when cloud computing is considered, there are organizational risks in the cloud as well. 
In essence, cloud computing is a form of outsourcing; the risks related to outsourcing 
apply equally to cloud computing. This chapter elaborates on these organizational as-
pects, and later in chapter 6 various approaches for managing the cloud relationships are 
presented. 
4.4.1  Lack of trust 
Trust is a key element in any business relationship, but even more so when an organiza-
tion decides to transfer their business-critical data outside their safety perimeter and into 
the hands of a third party. Khan & Malluhi (2010, 20) define trust as the level of confi-
dence in someone acting or behaving according to expectations; it’s a metric of reliabil-
ity. Garrison et al. (2012, 66) analyzed the relationship between the cloud service pro-
vider and cloud customer, and concluded that in order to successfully adopt cloud com-
puting, mutual trust must first be established. They define trust as the expectation that 
the other party performs their responsibilities well and treats the other organization re-
sponsibly. Although they analyzed the relationship mainly from the customer’s perspec-
tive, this definition works both ways and can be applied to both parties. Without trust, 
the interaction between the parties could be defined by uncertainty and suspicion, possi-
bly leading to miscommunications (Garrison, Kim & Wakefield 2012, 68). 
Sangroya et al. (2010, 260–261) discuss the concept of trust and its relationship with 
the cloud technologies, noting that the current security concepts such as secure socket 
layer (SSL) combined with signatures and authentication methods do not alone guaran-
tee security in the cloud. Andert, Wakefield & Weise (2002, 8–10) divide the concept of 
trust into three different dimensions: 
• Direct trust 
• Transitive trust 
• Assumptive trust 
Direct trust is applicable when the authentication and security assurance process are 
performed by one single party; this is the most stringent model of trust and it’s usually 
employed by organizations that deal with sensitive data, such as health care organiza-
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tions, insurance companies or financial entities. This trust approach requires the most 
effort from the organization, as it is solely responsible for performing the validation of 
credentials. Transitive trust enables the partial delegation of the authentication and secu-
rity assurance process to multiple parties, given that all these parties have aligned their 
security policies and processes. This model of trust simplifies the validation process, as 
there are multiple responsible parties and the burden can be shared. Assumptive trust 
provides the least amount of trust of these trust models; there is no credential validation. 
As the name hints, the model works wholly under the assumption of trust, no more; this 
is why its application into the business domain should be carefully considered (Andert 
et al. 2002, 10). 
Ko, Jagadpramana, Mowbray, Pearson, Kirchberg, Liang & Lee (2011, 2) discuss 
different controls of trust, dividing them into preventive and detective controls. The 
former are in place to prevent risks from realizing, and include the usual security 
measures in the cloud; the detective controls complement the preventive in the sense 
that they provide information in case the preventive controls have failed. Both controls 
are required to successfully manage the trust in cloud computing. 
Khan & Malluhi (2010, 23) discuss various challenges to trust, naming diminished 
control and lack of transparency as major challenges. As discussed earlier in chapters 
3.3 and 3.4, the use of cloud computing resources inevitably leads to less control over 
computing resources, and this creates challenges regarding trust. The extent to which an 
organization loses control of the resources and delegates it to a service provider depends 
strongly on the cloud service and cloud deployment models; the transparency is similar-
ly dependent on the chosen models. 
Finally, Kumar, Sehgal, Chauhan, Gupta and Diwakar (2011, 419) conclude that the 
level and also the importance of trust in cloud computing depends on the participating 
organizations; it also depends on the value of the data that is stored and processed in the 
cloud. The less trust there is between the parties, the more control the cloud customer 
desires; all the way to the level of technology which would otherwise be delegated to 
the service provider. To conclude, there is always a balance between risk and trust; the 
more trust, the less risk and vice versa. 
4.4.2 Lock-in 
 
Cloud computing forms a relationship between the cloud service provider and the cloud 
customer. This relationship is and will be a great source of risk. The magnitude and the 
type of the risks posed by the relationship depend on the level of trust between the par-
ties in the cloud and the level of commitment in the relationship. Trust could be defined 
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as the confidence between the parties, based on how well the values of both parties are 
aligned  (Garrison, Kim & Wakefield 2012). 
This relationship is not always balanced, as sometimes one party could have leverage 
over the other. The provider has great influence over the customer once their data is on 
the cloud, as it might be difficult and costly to get it transferred onto another infrastruc-
ture. This balance is prone to change over time, for example if new cloud providers 
come to the market and increase competition. 
One big potential risk in the relationship between the provider and customer is a situ-
ation called lock-in, often referred to as vendor lock-in or data lock-in. It refers to the 
situation where the vendor has power over the cloud customer, as the customer cannot 
easily change the service provider and migrate their data and applications to another 
service provider’s cloud (Fox et al. 2009, 15). The lock-in has its grounds in the pro-
prietary technology, which leads to lack of interoperability and thus makes it very diffi-
cult to transfer the corporate data over to another service provider. The lack of interop-
erability is in practice the lack of standardization, which greatly hinders the develop-
ment of the cloud computing market (Penzelm, Kryvinska, Strauss & Gregu 2015, 393). 
The vendor lock-in has different consequences in different cloud service models. In 
SaaS, the lock-in concerns mainly the data. It is usually stored in a proprietary database, 
which prohibits the simple export and import of the data. Highly customized cloud ap-
plications might lead to the need to re-structure the data to make it compatible with an-
other service provider’s applications. This leads to very high costs when switching the 
provider (ENISA 2009, 26). This is also where the descriptive standards would help the 
mobility of the data (Borenstein, Blake 2011, 75). 
In PaaS, the lock-in takes place on the level of the API. This hinders the portability 
of the applications, as the runtime environments in PaaS are often highly customized 
and require extensive modification to existing applications to make them functional on 
another platform than what they were built on (ENISA 2009, 27). 
Finally, the lock-in in IaaS is very dependent on the type of services provided, and it 
is largely a question of virtual machine portability and compatibility. The amount of 
data is also a factor; the risk of lock-in increases linearly with increase in data quantity 
(ENISA 2009, 27). 
The vendor lock-in dilemma could grow even bigger with the ever-expanding cloud 
offerings; a saturated market combined with a big number of providers makes the dif-
ferentiation between different providers hard (Brender, Markov 2013, 729). The vested 
interests of the cloud service provider might also contribute to the problem of vendor 
lock-in, as the providers might have more incentives to hold on to their customers than 
make their data easily portable (ENISA 2009, 25). The risk of bankruptcy of a service 
provider could pose a serious threat to business continuity and jeopardize the company 
data (Sultan 2011, 275). 
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4.4.3 Outsourcing risks 
Clemons & Chen (2011, 3–6) compare the risks in cloud computing to risks in tradi-
tional outsourcing. In an IDC survey, the main concerns in outsourcing relationships 
were lock-in resulting from reduced competition and leading to cost increases; reduced 
control over the resources, specifically intellectual assets and finally, performance, data 
security, integrity and availability. Opportunity risk is such behavior where the provider 
acts out of self-interest and operates in a way that harms the customer. Clemons & Chen 
(2011, 4) list three main sources of opportunity risk: 
• Shirking and subpar performance 
• Poaching and intellectual property theft 
• Opportunity pricing, client lock-in and vendor hold-up 
Shirking refers to the situation where the vendor charges for full services but in reali-
ty delivers subpar performance; this is only possible because of asymmetric infor-
mation. The motivations could be financial, such as postponing or completely avoiding 
investments in infrastructure. Poaching could be considered a more serious threat to an 
organization, as it involves the compromising of the data and the potential resale of con-
fidential data to a competitor. Opportunistic re-pricing is in principle the same as vendor 
lock-in, as it stems from the vendor gaining leverage over the customer in the negotia-
tions and thus being able to charge high prices for the services as the costs of changing 
provider would be even higher (Clemons & Chen 2011, 4). Such risks are also dis-
cussed by Kaliski Jr & Pauley (2010, 4), who note that the tough competition in the 
cloud environment and the reduced visibility into the security and privacy arrangements 
of the cloud make it a tempting option for cloud service providers to make compromises 
to achieve cost savings. As a solution they call for more visibility into the monitoring 
and assessment of cloud computing, these topics will be elaborated on in chapter 6.3. 
Chow et al. (2009, 86) discuss the issue of third-party data control, raising multiple 
concerns over the applicable regulations and the lack of transparency and control. They 
raise the following points: 
• Due diligence 
• Auditing 
• Contractual obligations 
• Espionage 
• Data lock-in 
• Transitive relationships 
Due diligence questions are raised when a legal authority requires data from an or-
ganization; they need to be able to respond in a timely manner but storing the data in the 
cloud might hinder this process. Auditing is made difficult by the lack of control, as 
already discussed in the previous chapter; despite that the process of auditing must be 
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carried out. The contractual obligations organizations face when signing cloud agree-
ments need to be assessed properly, as sometimes these agreements include overzealous 
and overly broad statements. A good example is the Amazon’s EC2-contract, which 
technically prohibits the customer from filing an intellectual property infringement 
claim against Amazon, ever.  Espionage is a problem, especially in industries that have 
a high degree of intellectual property. There is always a risk that the cloud vendor un-
lawfully utilizes the data that is stored on their infrastructure for malicious purposes. 
Data lock-in or vendor lock in was discussed in the previous chapter. Last, the transitive 
nature of cloud computing relationships might lead to situations where the cloud service 
provider uses a subcontractor for running the infrastructure; thus further lowering the 
level of control in the cloud (Chow et al. 2009, 87). 
The organizational and relationship risks discussed in this chapter are only one sub-
set of the risks, but as the examples presented in the chapter show, they are a fundamen-
tal contributor to the overall risk in cloud computing. For technological risks there are 
technological solutions, but to properly implement these solutions and to monitor their 
success, the relationships need to be properly taken care of. Some of the risks in cloud 
computing can be managed more easily than others; some are more complex and require 
more nuanced risk management approaches. An example of a more straightforward risk 
category are the technological risks; they are caused by technology and can usually also 
be mitigated or minimized with the application of proper technological solutions. The 
organizational or relationship risks, on the other hand, require more refined and multi-
faceted risk management approaches and solutions.  
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5 RISKS IN CLOUD SERVICE MODELS 
The discussion about the different risks in previous chapter didn’t take any stance to the 
relationship between the different risk categories and the cloud service models. Howev-
er, as specified in the RQ2, this relationship is of great interest to this study, and the aim 
of this chapter is to analyze this relationship and the relevance of different risks and risk 
sources to each of the cloud service models. 
5.1 Risks in IaaS 
As discussed in chapter 3.3.1, IaaS is the service model that has the lowest level of ab-
straction to the cloud customer. This has an implication to the risks that can be consid-
ered most relevant to IaaS; most of them are on the lower end of the cloud stack. The 
responsibilities for the security measures in the cloud are shared between the cloud ser-
vice provider and the cloud customer, the service provider being responsible for the 
security of the hypervisor and the infrastructure below it, the customer having the re-
sponsibility from the OS level upwards. In practice this means that the one of the main 
sources of risks in IaaS is the virtualization technology (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 9). As 
Mather et al. (2009, 45) discussed, the risks in virtualization could be further catego-
rized into risks in virtualization software and risks in virtual OS. The risks presented in 
chapter 4.3.1 by Tsai et al. (2012), namely VM hopping, VM mobility, VM diversity 
and VM denial of service, are all very relevant in IaaS. Vaquero, Rodero-Merino & Mo-
rán (2011, 5–7) also discuss the relevance of different virtualization-related risks in the 
context of IaaS; they list VM monitoring, side channel attacks, data security and net-
work virtualization as key risks in IaaS. 
According to Mather et al. (2009, 135-136) the cloud customer's responsibilities in 
IaaS include the management of VM images including their security management, OS-
level security, database security and finally, access control management. This means 
that the IAM process, discussed in chapter 4.3.3 is also the cloud customer’s responsi-
bility. The risks related to data security are also relevant to IaaS. The confidentiality, 
integity and availability, as well as the location and privacy of the data could be com-
promised. 
The risks specific to IaaS are, as stated in the beginning, on a low level of the cloud 
stack. The applications that are hosted on the infrastructure can present a trove of risks; 
however, they are not related to the cloud per se. Because the view on the risks in this 
chapter is limited to only those specific to the service model under scrutiny, the risks 
posed by the application that is running on top of what’s considered in scope of the IaaS 
are irrelevant. For example, the risks posed by web services are an equally serious risk 
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regardless of the service model; however, these risks are not related to IaaS but rather 
the applications themselves. 
5.2 Risks in PaaS 
In PaaS, the most significant risks are related to the application deployment environ-
ment, which is a key part of the cloud platform. Subashini & Kavitha (2011, 8–9) dis-
cuss the level of control the PaaS customer has over the security features and the rele-
vant responsibilities. They argue that the PaaS provides more capabilities for the cus-
tomer to create custom security solutions in addition to the security features provided by 
the development platform, but also note that developing such solutions might present 
further complexity and undermine the cloud security. Risks in web technologies are also 
relevant in in PaaS, as the development platform is browser-based and thus subject to all 
vulnerabilities that concern the underlying technologies (Grobauer, Walloschek & 
Stöcker 2011, 52). The risk of a data lock-in is relevant to PaaS, specifically when the 
platform utilizes proprietary technology (Fox et al. 2009, 15). 
5.3 Risks in SaaS 
As discussed in chapter 3.3.3, SaaS has the highest level of abstraction to the customer, 
which has a significant effect on the risks that are specific or relevant to SaaS. The sin-
gle biggest risk is lock-in, usually caused by proprietary technologies that give the cloud 
service provider leverage regarding the transporting of data out of their system, as the 
data won’t be usable as such in other systems and might need to be restructured to be 
used elsewhere. 
The web application security is a concern in all service models, but it has the most 
relevance for SaaS, as the model has the most complexity and usually is the most reliant 
on different web applications (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 7). The responsibility for the 
web application security is mostly the service provider’s responsibility, excluding basic 
security related routines such as user and access control. The standard SaaS user access 
controls might not be sufficiently fine-grained, which needs to be taken into considera-
tion when planning for the security in the cloud (Mather, Kumaraswamy & Latif 2009, 
53). Wu, Lan & Lee (2011, 556–557) propose the lack of trust in data security and net-
work security as relevant risks to SaaS. 
Popović (2010, 344–345) further lists privileged user access, data location, segrega-
tion and recovery; regulatory compliance and long-term viability as risk sources in 
SaaS. Long-term viability in this context is a reference to data lock-in; a bankruptcy or a 
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merger with an unknown third company could create the risk of data lock-in or vendor 
lock-in. All in all, SaaS could be concluded to be the riskiest service model to the cloud 
customer in the sense that it poses the biggest risk of lock-in while providing the least 
amount of control and visibility into the infrastructure. However, these risks are present 
also in the other service models, only to a lesser extent. 
To conclude this analysis and to answer the RQ2, most of the risks are present in all 
cloud service models. The risks that are present at the lowest level of the infrastructure 
are also applicable on the higher levels. The risks in virtualization are present in SaaS as 
much as in PaaS and IaaS, posing a risk of compromising the organization’s data securi-
ty. The higher on the cloud stack the cloud service is positioned, the less control is pro-
vided to the cloud customer and the less independence they have regarding the cloud 
security measures. Indeed, when choosing the service model, an organization should 
carefully consider what they want to achieve by utilizing cloud, and especially what 
safety concerns need to be specifically accounted for in the cloud. In IaaS, the cloud 
customer has a high degree of control over the virtualized resources, but they also have 
a similarly high degree of responsibility for all the security measures in the cloud, from 
the OS level upwards. This might be a concern to the some organizations, as one of the 
promises of the cloud is the ease of adoption and ease of use. The manifestation of risks 
differs depending on the chosen cloud service model. This means that the cloud service 
models do affect the risks in the cloud, but only to a certain extent. Any single service 
model doesn’t introduce any novel risks compared to the other service models, i.e. IaaS 
inherently includes the same risks as SaaS, but some of the risks are more relevant to 
IaaS than to SaaS, as discussed. 
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6 MANAGING THE RISKS IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
The focus in the previous chapter was on the risks in cloud computing, and the RQ2. 
This chapter proposes ways to manage these risks, and aims to create a link between the 
various risks in cloud computing and the tools for mitigating these risks. The aim is to 
provide an answer to RQ3. The management of risks here refers to either minimizing 
the outcomes of potential risks or removing the risk altogether, with the ultimate aim 
being the insurance of business continuity. Ramgovind, Eloff & Smith (2010, 5) suggest 
that to manage the risks in cloud computing, the organization should consider the cur-
rent and future risks to cloud compliance, and estimate how the adoption of cloud com-
puting affects those risks. This could be accomplished by adopting standards, frame-
works or other tools that aid in increasing cloud transparency and governance. 
6.1 Service level agreements 
The service level agreement, or SLA is an elemental tool in managing the relationship 
between the cloud service provider and the cloud customer. It is a document that is used 
to clarify the contents of the service and the responsibilities of the different parties in 
outsourcing relationships; it also defines the quality of service (QoS) in the cloud (Patel, 
Ranabahu & Sheth 2009, 2). The contents of the SLA should be defined in a way that 
guarantee enough details and granularity to the cloud customer but at the same are sim-
ple to evaluate and enforce (Dillon, Wu & Chang 2010, 31). According to Kandukuri, 
Paturi & Rakshit (2009, 518), the service level agreement should include detailed in-
formation regarding the following points: 
• The extent of the agreed services 
• Definition of the agreed performance 
• Agreement on problems resolution 
• The responsibilities of the customer 
• Guarantees and remedies 
• Security measures 
• Business continuity 
• Termination of the contract 
The extent of the services is the backbone of the SLA, as it essentially defines what 
is being sold; the performance measurement is then required to ensure that the agreed 
performance level is achieved. The problem resolution refers to the channel through 
which outages and other incidents are handled, and it’s closely linked with the security 
and business continuity of the cloud service. The cloud customer also has responsibili-
ties, usually regarding access and security. The extent of these responsibilities is de-
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pendent on the chosen service model. Guarantees and remedies are relevant in situations 
where the quality of service is negatively affected; these define the compensation for 
such incidents. Defining security measures is perhaps the single most relevant point in 
the SLA regarding risks and their management in the cloud; they cover the essential 
security responsibilities, measures and procedures. The business continuity is an equally 
important part of the SLA, and it’s tightly linked to the security topic. Finally, specific 
conditions such as cause and time frame for the termination of the contract are usually 
agreed on (Kandukuri et al. 2009, 518). 
Clemons & Chen (2011, 8) list three key dimensions that need to be taken into ac-
count in cloud computing contracts: performance, security and legal recourse. The legal 
recourse defines how and by whom the legal claims need to be made, how those claims 
need to be backed and where the subsequent disputes will eventually be solved. Many 
big cloud service providers such as Amazon and Google put both the initiative and the 
burden of proof on the cloud customer. The provider doesn’t take an active role; rather 
it’s the customer who needs to present detailed evidence of the reduced performance or 
other issues (Patel, Ranabahu & Sheth 2009, 2–3). The legal recourse is an important 
part of the SLA, and it can be used to significantly reduce contractual risks; it is espe-
cially important if the cloud service provider and customer are located in different coun-
tries and thus within different jurisdictions. As such cases fall under the realm of inter-
national law, it is crucial to know which laws are applicable. 
The second contractual dimension described by Clemons & Chen (2011, 8) is per-
formance, which is a composition of multiple different metrics: 
• Minimum service availability per given time period 
• Minimum system response time 
• Support response time 
• Network and system stability 
• Service quality and reliability 
As can be seen from these metrics, the performance is a contract dimension that can 
easily be measured, and thus also easily enforced by the cloud customer. Some cloud 
customers might find it problematic that the cloud service provider is solely responsible 
for measuring the performance. To increase the reliability of the metrics, the task of 
measuring could be delegated to a third party to (Patel, Ranabahu & Sheth 2009, 2). The 
performance of the cloud is also strongly linked to the operational risks presented in 
chapter 4, specifically the availability. The uptime guaranteed in the SLA sets a baseline 
for cloud availability. Usually the uptime is defined as a percentage, i.e. the service is 
available, say 99,9% of the specified time frame, be it a week or a month. Usually it is 
also defined whether the guarantee applies to public network or a private network (Kan-
dukuri, Paturi & Rakshit 2009, 519). 
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The third dimension presented by Clemons & Chen (2011, 8) is security. It is a broad 
and elemental area of cloud computing to be included in the SLA. It is very relevant to 
the cloud computing risks, specifically to data security. The ownership of and the access 
to the data need to be unambiguously defined in the SLA, so that there will be no uncer-
tainties. Kalyvas, Overly & Karlyn (2013, 20–21) also discuss the definition of security 
in the context of the SLA, emphasizing the unique challenges posed to data security by 
the cloud as discussed earlier in chapter 4.2. 
The SLA also has its limitations as a tool for managing outsourcing, specifically in 
the cloud realm. The traditional SLA is a static document written in natural language. 
Its conditions are based on the information available at the time of drafting and they are 
usually reviewed periodically or on demand. This process is manual and thus very slow, 
which limits the enforcement of the SLA in the cloud realm (Keller, Ludwig 2003, 58). 
Dillon, Wu & Chang (2010, 31) voice similar concerns, regarding the enforceability of 
the SLA in the dynamic cloud environment, where the constantly changing resource 
usage and the sheer number of different customers with their individual SLAs make the 
manual monitoring and management of the resources impossible. The self-service na-
ture of the cloud requires automation for the resource provisioning, placing similar re-
quirement for the SLA enforcement process. 
To address this problem, a special adaptation of the SLA is proposed by Keller & 
Ludwig (2003, 58), namely the WSLA, which stands for Web Service Level Agree-
ment. It is an adaption of the SLA, which takes into consideration the dynamic nature of 
web services; the model recognizes that different customer have different demands, 
which change dynamically. Patel et al. (2009, 3) have assessed the WSLA model and its 
compatibility to cloud computing. The model is divided into parties, SLA parameters 
and service level objectives, each with their own subsets: 
• Parties 
o Service provider 
o Customer 
o Third party 
• SLA parameters 
o Resource metrics 
o Composite metrics 
o Business metrics 
• Service level objectives 
o If metric Y exceeds level X then action A 
o If metric Z goes under value R, then action B 
The first two parties are the cloud service provider and the cloud customer. The third 
party could have various different roles depending on the service and deployment mod-
els. The third party could be performing a particular task, which is more specifically 
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defined in the SLA parameters and objectives. Such a task could be for example the 
measuring of reaching availability levels defined in the SLA parameters and the subse-
quent actions caused by underperformance. The SLA parameters are metrics that are 
used to monitor the performance, usage and a multitude of other functions of the cloud. 
Resource metrics are derived straight from the service provider’s unmodified data, ex-
ample of such a metric is the transaction count. Composite metrics are a combination of 
multiple metrics, such as transactions per hour or day. The business metrics tie the SLA 
parameters to business goals individually for each customer (Patel, Ranabahu & Sheth 
2009, 3). 
Buyya, Yeo & Venugopal (2008, 4) argue that the rising popularity of cloud compu-
ting introduces inflexibility to the market, as the service providers are incapable of ne-
gotiating customer-specific SLAs due to the sheer number of cloud customers. This is a 
serious shortfall, as the details of the SLA are important to most customers. Many or-
ganizations have specific requirements, which have to be included in the SLA to ensure 
proper due diligence and the continuity of business operations despite incidents. Buyya 
et al. (2008, 5) propose to use service brokers, who are specialized in finding service 
providers with the given criteria and connect only those customers and providers who 
have similar expectations of the quality of service. This idea shares common ground 
with the WSLA model, as both models present an external party for handling the moni-
toring of the QoS. However, the model Buyya et al. propose is more market oriented 
whereas the WSLA model is built on the relationship between a single provider and 
customer. 
Morin, Aubert & Gateau (2012, 5512–5513) propose an approach that combines the 
SLA with a risk management framework. The resulting service level framework would 
support real-time risk management and be adaptable to different architectures and ser-
vice models; it would also be linked to operational management and modeling of risks. 
These goals can be achieved with the help of a policy-based approach combined with 
proper exception management to accommodate flexibility. 
Kalyvas, Overly & Karlyn (2013, 20) present a concern regarding cloud computing 
involving multiple tiers, e.g. one party providing the service and another party hosting 
the data. In such cases, the third party should face the same requirements presented to 
the cloud service provider; otherwise the SLA would be pointless. In such cases some 
kind of an agreement should also be made with the third party; the original SLA alone is 
not sufficient to guarantee the level of service. More importantly, a separate agreement 
clarifies the legal obligations and makes the enforcement of the SLA more straightfor-
ward. 
To conclude, the SLA is a critical document in cloud computing as it defines both the 
broad and the detailed terms of the relationship between the cloud customer and service 
provider. When there are clearly defined metrics for service measurement, responsibili-
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ties are unequivocally defined for both parties and potential legal issues are tied to cer-
tain legislation and jurisdiction, an organization has a firm grip of the security in the 
cloud. 
6.2 Standards, frameworks & security models 
The world of information systems is full of different standards; risk management in in-
formation systems is no different. Raz & Hillson (2005, 55) discuss nine different risk 
management standards, including national standards and standards defined by special-
ized organizations. The aim of the analysis was to compare various risk management 
standards on a regarding their scope, the analytical process and whether any of the 
standards have a specific emphasis. The following risk management standards were 
included in the analysis: 
• IEEE Standard 1540-2001 
• CEI/IEC 62198:2001 
• JIS Q2001:2001(E) 
• AS/NZS 4360:2004 
• BS6079-3:2000 
• CAN/CSA-Q850-97 
• Risk Management Standard 
• Project Risk Analysis & Management (PRAM) Guide 
• Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBoK): Chapter 11, 
Project Risk Management 
These frameworks were evaluated from various viewpoints, such as the organizing 
and planning of management of the risks; and the main phases of risk management: risk 
identification, risk analysis and risk treatment. The risk identification is elemental to 
any risk management process; identifying the relevant risks is a key part and starting 
point for proper risk management. In this study, the RQ1 is focused on the identification 
cloud-relevant risks. After risk identification, a further risk analysis is done to properly 
weigh the various risks in relation to their contexts. The focus in the RQ2 is on the 
evaluation of particular risks regarding their relevance to particular contexts, or in this 
case, the service models. 
Raz & Hillson (2005, 58) recognize two distinct activities in the risk analysis phase, 
namely risk estimation and risk assessment. They define the risk estimation as the eval-
uation of the likelihood of the risks; the assessment is the process of prioritizing the 
estimated risks according to their treatment priority. The most common ways for risk 
treatment discovered in the analysis were risk avoidance, reducing the probability of 
risk, limiting the consequences of risks and finally transferring risks (Raz, Hillson 2005, 
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58). The conclusion of the analysis was that the standards were found to be similar in 
many regards, the biggest differences being in the planning phase, where the risk man-
agement principles, the organizational responsibilities and roles are defined. 
Mather et al. (2009, 112–113) also discuss standards regarding cloud computing with 
a focus on security management in the cloud. They specifically discuss ITIL and ISO 
27001/27002. ITIL is not a standard per se, but a framework gathering best practices in 
service management. Information security is an essential part of service management, 




• Work instructions 
These components define the organization’s objectives; the methods; and the respon-
sibilities and specific steps needed for reaching these objectives. ITIL’s focus on service 
management ties it closely with incident and change management, which have a big 
effect on the security in the cloud. ITIL is partly based on ISO/IEC 17799:2005 and 
ISO/IEC 20000. ISO 27001/27002, the other standard discussed by Mather et al. (2009, 
113) consists of two parts. The ISO27001 is a certification standard, which strictly spec-
ifies the security management requirements that are needed for ISO-compliance, where-
as ISO27002 sets guidelines to reach these requirements. The guidelines of ISO27002 
can also be wholly or partially implemented in order to improve security management 
also without the ISO certification. 
The division of the ISO 27001/27002 into two standards is more generally discussed 
by Borenstein & Blake (2011, 75). They divide standards into two distinct categories: 
prescriptive standards and evaluative standards. The former are detailed technical speci-
fications and aim to cover all aspects of the technology whereas the evaluative standards 
gather best practices and processes and evaluate how well these are realized; they are 
also much less technical. The evaluative standards would provide a more valuable tool 
for companies considering the adoption of cloud computing. With a proper standard and 
framework the company could evaluate the service providers in order to find out which 
provider could be trusted  (Borenstein, Blake 2011, 76–77). 
Borenstein et al. (2011, 75 – 76) also argue that the cloud computing paradigm 
doesn’t create the need for any new prescriptive standards per se, as the majority of the 
technology utilized for cloud computing is already covered by different standards and is 
also well understood. The proprietary tools different cloud vendors have developed on 
their own further add complexity and unnecessary boundaries; it’s also not very realistic 
to expect the providers to reveal the details of their proprietary technologies to their 
competitors. However, they recognize the need for evaluative standards. As the services 
are transferred over to the cloud and the company has significantly less power over 
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them, it becomes crucial that there are tools in place to ensure the quality of the ser-
vices. 
Popović (2010, 346) discusses various standards, including the already discussed 
ITIL, ISO/IEC 20000 and ISO 27001/27002. They further present open virtualization 
format (OVF), which is an open standard specifically designed to improve the portabil-
ity and platform independency of virtual systems. They argue that by utilizing open 
standards, organizations can introduce flexibility to deployment and utilize a broader 
range of providers due to the good compatibility, which in turn significantly decreases 
the risk of vendor lock-in. Another open solution, Eucalyptus is discussed by Nurmi, 
Wolski & Grzegorczyk (2009, 126). It’s a flexible architecture model based on modular 
components, it supports multiple web technologies including the Amazon’s EC2 and 
S3; it also provides a high level of isolation.  
Cloud security alliance presents a collection of best practices in cloud security, gath-
ered from vendors, customers and individuals with the aim of improving cloud security 
in general (Subashini, Kavitha 2011, 9). Vouk (2008, 242–243) presents concerns re-
garding the existing commercial solutions, which are often either hypervisor- or plat-
form-specific and thus present an inherent risk of lock-in. They similarly propose the 
use of open solutions to improve the portability in the cloud. Beimborn, Miletzki & 
Wenzel (2011, 384) call for a general reference model, in order to mitigate this risk. 
Kaliski Jr & Pauley (2010, 1–4), propose the use of thorough risk assessments as a 
tool to manage the risks in cloud computing. They further argue that the very properties 
that make the cloud so attractive to the cloud customers also make the proper assess-
ment of privacy and security of the cloud very hard to conduct properly. The ultimate 
argument they make is that cloud services should be assessed by the same method they 
are provided; they propose risk assessment as a service. In the proposed model, the 
cloud security, availability and performance are monitored continuously on a real-time 
basis so that any disruptions, safety violations or security compromises can be acted 
upon immediately. Together with the more traditional periodical assessments, continu-
ous checks form a risk management framework capable of dynamically adopting to the 
requirements posed by multitenancy and other ever-changing aspects of the cloud, thus 
providing reliable information of the state of the cloud. 
To conclude, there are multiple non-profit organizations involved in developing 
cloud security in addition to the different national standards and standards created by 
specialized organizations. Some standards are more specific and require more effort 
from an organization, whereas some are broader and more adoptable to specific organi-
zational needs; a good example of the latter is ISO 27002. Borenstein et al. (2011, 76) 
promote its adoption into wider use, Srinivasan (2012, 133) also propose to use the 
standard for benchmarking the security standards for the organization. The standards 
and frameworks are in themselves useful tools for benchmarking and mapping the ca-
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pabilities of an organization and the preparedness against risks, but mapping and 
benchmarking alone are not sufficient to ensure risk resilience. The wide organizational 
adoption of the proposed measures into practice is an elemental part of risk management 
regardless of the framework or standard that is applied. 
6.3 Trust 
As discussed in chapter 4.4.1, trust is a key element in cloud computing relationships, 
and the lack thereof presents many risks to both parties. Pearson (2009, 6) argues that to 
improve trust, the cloud user’s control over their data should be maximized and the pro-
vider’s capabilities to access and process the data should be limited to the bare mini-
mum. The control of the data refers to the knowledge of the whereabouts of the data and 
the ways in which the data is handled and processed. The more control over the data an 
organization has, the better their chances of maintaining its confidentiality and integrity. 
Khan & Malluhi (2010, 20) argue that distrust stems from the lack of transparency, fear 
of data loss and missing security assurances. Sangroya, Kumar, Dhok & Varma (2010, 
261) note that the element of trust is absent from most cloud computing models, leading 
to perceived security weaknesses from the cloud customer’s perspective. They divide 
trust into three distinct models: direct trust, transitive trust and assumptive trust; these 
were discussed earlier in chapter 4.4.1. Zhao et al. (2010, 190 – 192) expand on these 
trust models by proposing an approach, where trust is gained by introducing third par-
ties into the equation. They suggest five different cloud deployment models, which dif-
fer in the responsibilities and the number of parties and the ways the services are set up: 
• Separation model 
• Availability model 
• Migration model 
• Tunnel model 
• Cryptography model 
The separation model adds a middleman into the traditional cloud equation; one pro-
vider is responsible for data manipulation; another provider is responsible for the data 
storage. This way none of the providers gains disproportionate control over the cloud 
customer. The availability model doubles on the separation model by adding another 
pair of providers: there are two providers doing the data manipulation and two providers 
providing the storage in a parallel set-up. The storage services are synchronized via a 
replication service in order to gain further redundancy. The third model, migration mod-
el is mainly based on a two-tier-architecture; however, in this model the data is replicat-
ed to a third party, differentiating the migration model from the separation model. The 
fourth model, tunnel model is similar to the separation model; the only difference is that 
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the data flow between the two providers is encrypted. Finally the cryptography model 
adds a third party who is responsible for the encryption; otherwise the model is identical 
with the tunnel model (Zhao et al. 2010, 190–192). All these proposed models have the 
goal of mitigating the possibility of one party having a disproportionate control over the 
other. In order for the proposed deployment models to work, there is a need for high 
interoperability between different cloud services. These models are high-level concepts, 
and their implementation into practice requires a high level of interoperability, coordi-
nation and standardization; the technologies, such as cryptographic protocols and inter-
faces also need to be considered (Zhao et al. 2010, 193–193). Despite these obvious 
shortfalls, these models are a good starting point for finding solutions to the trust issues 
in the cloud. 
Zissis & Lekkas (2012, 588) also present a model, where a trusted third party plays a 
major role. In their model, the third party reviews all transactions and communications 
between the cloud parties providing confidentiality, authentication and authorization. 
The third party is also responsible for ensuring the cryptographic protection and separa-
tion of the data. The advances of using the third party are the increased confidence and 
trust between parties; modern security technologies such as PKI (Public Key Infrastruc-
ture), SSO (Single Sign-On) and LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) are 
utilized to ensure the CIA of the data in the cloud. 
Chen, Paxson & Katz (2010, 5) discuss the prerequisites for the creation of trust in 
cloud computing; they promote mutual auditability as a tool that could be used to im-
prove trust. Mutual auditability refers to audits performed by an independent third party 
on both the cloud customer and the vendor. The model challenges the traditional, logs- 
and records-based auditing process, where the documents to be audited are provided 
solely by the cloud service provider. Instead, both parties are placed under scrutiny; the 
ultimate aim of which is to ensure mutual trust. The mutual auditability relies on im-
proved transparency, which is one approach to improving trust and thus the security in 
cloud computing. The open source initiatives presented in chapter 6.2 are a good exam-
ple of transparency; as the technology is open to everyone, it can also freely be re-
viewed and analyzed as opposed to proprietary technology and standards. However, this 
transparency isn’t limited only to technology, but also to the relationship between the 
cloud customer and cloud service provider. Ramgovind et al. (2010, 6) propose greater 
transparency as the solution to security risk management in cloud computing. The more 
knowledge about the service provider, their operating procedures and security proce-
dures is available, the easier it is to evaluate and adequately monitor the provided ser-
vice. Ko et al. (2011, 1–2) list security, privacy, accountability and auditability as the 
trust components in the cloud; together they build they mitigate the barriers for cloud 
adoption and thus increase the confidence level the cloud customers place on the cloud. 
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Khan & Malluhi (2010, 21) divide trust into control, ownership, prevention and secu-
rity. Control has a tendency to increase trust; the more control an organization has over 
the cloud where their data is stored, the more likely they also trust the cloud. The degree 
of ownership has a similar effect on trust. The added complexity in the cloud makes the 
ownership an important trust factor, as the ownership of the data might not always be 
clear when there are multiple parties involved. Prevention refers to the aim of the ser-
vice provider to decrease the likelihood of adverse events; it is closely tied to the con-
tractual aspects of the cloud. Khan & Malluhi note that to increase the level of trust, the 
focus should be on preventing trust violations rather than figuring out proper compensa-
tion for occurred trust violations; their argument is that money can’t buy a new reputa-
tion in the case there is significant loss of customer data. The last aspect of trust, securi-
ty, is an underlying topic throughout this study and is by nature a crucial part of trust  
(Khan & Malluhi 2010, 21). 
Trust in the cloud is discussed also by Chow et al. (2009, 86–87), with the focus on 
third-party data control. They argue that the decreased control over data makes the tasks 
of auditing, due diligence and monitoring of contractual obligations more difficult to 
perform, in addition to increasing the risk of espionage, data lock-in and the transfer-
ence of data to unknown parties. To avoid these risks, specifically the data lock-in and 
the possibility of the data ending up to the hands of malicious parties, trust-based coop-
eration between the different parties is prerequisite. 
Khan & Malluhi (2010, 23–24) suggest encryption as a tool for enhancing the priva-
cy and CIA of data, combined with emerging technologies such as remote access con-
trol, transparency-enabling tools and the proactive verification of the provider’s reputa-
tion. Security certification and compartmentalization of the data into private enclaves to 
enable and ensure the isolation of the data are also suggested. Chow et al (2009, 89), 
develop the idea of using encryption further; they propose an approach called privacy-
enhanced business intelligence. It’s an approach that utilizes advanced cryptographic 
technologies to encrypt all the data in the cloud. The distinction to traditional encryption 
is that instead of having to decrypt the data to utilize it, queries and other computing 
operations are performed on the encrypted data, thus significantly increasing the overall 
data security. The approach is made possible by the advancements in cryptographic 
technologies; traditional encryption combined with database technologies doesn’t pro-
vide the same capabilities. 
Pearson & Benameur (2010, 696–670) divide trust into persistent trust and dynamic 
trust, persistent trust being the long-term trust in the infrastructure and its properties, the 
dynamic trust being a short-term, context-specific kind of trust. Further, they differenti-
ate between technological trust and social trust; both aspects need to be considered; 
there is also the need to consider the trust relationships throughout the cloud supply 
chain. Third parties, in addition to providing additional trust in various set-ups, can also 
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introduce uncertainties and liabilities that need to be recognized. These weak trust rela-
tionships often stem from the need to rapidly scale the cloud infrastructure according to 
demand. 
The technological trust is touched upon also by Kumar et al. (2011, 416), who dis-
cuss the proceedings of the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). These proceedings in-
clude several points on the integrity of cloud computing systems, such as authenticating 
and asserting the origins of configuration changes and executables; verification of con-
text for executing processes and tamper-proof, verifiable audit records. They also re-
mind that there can never be complete trust in cloud computing; the technology dictates 
that there will always be lack of control and thus lack of trust inherent in the cloud. 
In addition to the listed improvement areas, Kumar et al. (2011) propose the follow-
ing ways to improve the level of trust in cloud computing: 
• Development of the trust policies 
• Trust semantics and assurance practices 
• Privacy management technology 
• Trusted identity management (IDM) solutions 
• Development of interoperable, multi-platform key management systems 
All these tools and technological approaches to trust improvement are only enablers 
of trust, not sources of trust themselves. Organizations need to consider their require-
ments regarding the degree of trust required and adopt the relevant tools to achieve this 
level; the sensitivity of the data is a big influencer on the trust level. 
Finally, Vaquero et al. (2011, 11) argue that improving auditability is the key to the 
creation of trust, especially in case of complex trust chains created by multiple actors in 
the cloud supply chain. They promote an API-focused model, where the audit metrics 
are presented in a machine-readable form enabling the automation of the auditing pro-
cess. 
All in all, it is clear that to promote the wider adoption of cloud computing, the 
amount of trust needs to be sufficient. This is especially true when the cloud is used to 
store sensitive data that might be under strict regulations, for example the HIPAA-
regulation that sets the limitations to the use of healthcare data of US citizens. Trust 
needs to be built on personal relations as well as technology capable of providing the 
tools for monitoring and enabling new kind of trust relationships emerging, making it 
possible for new kinds of services and business models to be built on top of cloud infra-
structure. New standards and technologies enabling portability further enhance the secu-
rity, confidentiality, integrity and availability of data and the proliferation of trust in the 




In this study, the various risks in cloud computing were discussed, based on the SPI-
division of service models and the assumption of public cloud computing. The research 
question RQ1 focused on finding out what risks cloud computing presents to companies 
in general compared to the traditional, in-house IT infrastructure. Cloud computing, 
especially public cloud, is an inherently risky way of providing the computing needs for 
an organization, as the model always introduces additional actors and thus additional 
risks. The risks vary in their seriousness and relevance to different aspects of the cloud; 
there are some inherent technical risks in the cloud computing technology whereas the 
lack of trust and risks in outsourcing are social and legal in nature and thus need differ-
ent risk management approaches. 
There are risks to data security, which in the worst case might endanger the business 
operations of the whole company; these risks are related to data confidentiality, integrity 
and availability. The location and availability of the data also have significant implica-
tions to an organization, as they affect the regulations, rules and laws that apply; this is 
especially important when an organization uses sensitive data, such as health care in-
formation in their daily business operations. 
Virtualization technology makes large-scale cloud computing possible and more im-
portantly, viable by enabling the cloud service providers to utilize economies of scale in 
providing services at a negligible unit cost. This technology is complex, and in itself 
presents many risks that could compromise an organization’s data. In cloud computing, 
the resources are accessed over the public Internet, which expands the trust boundaries 
of the This presents many threats that are not present in the traditional, isolated corpo-
rate networks, and dictates the need for secure web technologies and technologies for 
identity and access management. 
The relationship between the cloud service provider and the cloud customer is anoth-
er important factor to the risks in cloud computing. This relationship is founded on trust 
between the parties; trust is also a precondition to successfully adopting cloud compu-
ting. The lack of trust might lead to multiple problems such as vendor or data lock-in, 
effectively preventing the change of the service provider. There are also many risks that 
generally apply to the realm of outsourcing such as opportunity risks, reduced transpar-
ency and thus control and the risk of espionage. 
The focus on RQ2 was on the relevance of the identified risks to each service model. 
Most of the risks in the cloud are relevant in all service models, specifically the risks 
that are on the lower end of the cloud stack. The higher-level risks, such as the web 
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technology-related risks form an exception; they are not relevant in IaaS as the offerings 
are limited only to the OS-level. 
Finally, RQ3 aimed to provide an answer to organizations could prepare themselves 
for these risks and manage, even mitigate them. Service level agreements, an elemental 
part of any outsourcing agreement, can be used as tool for managing the risks in cloud 
computing. The traditional, written SLAs might not suffice, however, which is why 
many new approaches embrace different technical solutions for monitoring and as-
sessing the real-time performance and service level of the cloud. Different standards and 
frameworks provide a wide array of tools for evaluating and managing the risks in the 
cloud. Finally, trust both as a social construct and in the form of different trust models 
combining technology with third parties are a way of making cloud computing safer, 
more secure and most importantly, less risky. 
Despite the delegation of many security responsibilities to the cloud service provider, 
in the end an organization is solely responsible for the security of their data in the cloud. 
Jansen & Grance conclude: 
”Accountability for security and privacy in public cloud deployments 
cannot be delegated to a cloud provider and remains an obligation for 
the organization to fulfill.”(Jansen, Grance 2011, 52) 
7.2 Limitations and implications for future research 
This study was conducted as a literature review, without empirical data. The aim was to 
gather knowledge about the risks in cloud computing in literature and to further analyze, 
which of these risks are commonly considered to be inherent to the cloud. As the pace 
of development in the cloud realm is very fast, studies about the most recent develop-
ments in the cloud were rather hard to find; two of the most recent studies reviewed for 
this study were from the years 2014 and 2015, respectively. A good example of the fast 
development is the introduction of container technology, which enables the cloud cus-
tomers to move the data between clouds of different service providers, thus greatly in-
creasing portability and decreasing the risk of lock-in. Unfortunately, there is little 
available research related to this area. 
To further analyze the risk landscape of the cloud, the link between different service 
models and particular risks could be analyzed further as well as the effects of the de-
ployment models to the risk. To conduct a more nuanced assessment of these relation-
ships, empirical data would be preferential to another literature review. 
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